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Abstract
In December 2006, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced that it had reviewed all the
available evidence and was poised to approve meat and milk from cloned animals and their progeny. Such
products, said the FDA, are virtually identical to meat or milk from a non-clone. Further, the FDA announced
it would almost certainly not require food from clones to be labeled as such. Part I of this article identifies
three functions that labels perform, outlines the types of information usually required, and introduces the rule
that voluntary label information cannot be misleading. Part II focuses on process information and its
implications. The article argues that there is no truly voluntary labeling when consumers care about a feature;
if some products are labeled, then unlabeled products bear a de facto label by implication. Partly because of
the de facto mandatory labeling principle, process labeling has the potential to mislead consumers. In Part III
the article examines some relevant characteristics of consumers and argues that not all consumers can be
misled by label information. Consumers who have no preferenc3es or who are very knowledgeable about the
labeled feature are not misled by process labeling. Finally, using labeling of genetically modified (GM)
ingredients as an example, the article suggests that mandatory labeling of some process information could
enhance consumer sovereignty and welfare.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2006, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
announced that it had reviewed all the available evidence and was
poised to approve meat and milk from cloned animals and their
progeny.' I remember telling one of my colleagues, a patent law
* Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. A lot of people helped
me think about these issues. I am grateful to Peter Hemberger for reading multiple
drafts and his great research assistance. Thanks also to Margaret Sova McCabe
and Paul Smith, who read earlier drafts and provided useful and encouraging
comments. My 2008 Food Law Seminar students heard and commented on a
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professor, who should be as comfortable with technology as anyone,
about this development, and his response was, "Yuck. I'm not eating
it!" To which of course I replied, "Humph. You won't know the
difference." Meat or milk from a clone or its descendant is virtually
identical to meat or milk from a non-clone, said the FDA, as it also
announced that it would almost certainly not require food from
clones to be labeled.2
Information on food labels must be true and not misleading.3 If
food is chemically different from the standard, it must be so labeled,
presentation of an early version, as did participants in the Food, Law & Society
session of the 2008 American Society for Law and the Humanities meeting. Fi-
nally, if it were not for Mark Schmitz, I would still be floundering; he helped me
make this a priority, and even mowed my lawn. I am deeply grateful.
1. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Draft Documents on
the Safety of Animal Clones (Dec. 28, 2006) [hereinafter FDA Press Release],
available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/
2006/ucm108819.htm. The announcement in December of 2006 included a draft
of a risk assessment on animal cloning completed by the FDA's Center for Veteri-
nary Medicine. A final version of that draft assessment was released in January of
2008. See CTR. FOR VETERINARY MED., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., ANIMAL CLONING: A RISK ASSESSMENT 330 (2008) [hereinafter FDA
DRAFT RISK AssSESMENT], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Ani-
malVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AnimalCloning/UCM124756.pdf; see also Andrew
Martin & Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Says Food from Cloned Animals Is Safe, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/01/16/business/16clone.html?_r=1 ; Milk and Meat from Cloned Animals
Safe to Eat, FDA Says, THE ONLINE NEWS HOUR, Dec. 28, 2006,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/science/july-decO6/cloningl 2-28.html.
2. FDA Press Release, supra note 1; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Consumer
FAQs, http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AnimalCIoning/
ucm055516.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (stating that labeling of cloned meat
and dairy would not be required because "there is no science-based reason to use
labels to distinguish between milk derived from clones and that from conventional
animals"); see also FDA DRAFT RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 330 ("Analy-
ses of the composition of meat from bovine and swine clones and milk from bo-
vine clones consistently indicate that there are no biologically relevant differences
between the composition of food from clones, or their close comparators. In addi-
tion, there is no material difference, based on these studies, between the composi-
tion of meat and milk from clones and historical reference ranges of the composi-
tion of food from conventionally-bred animals.").
3. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (2006). A food is misbranded if "its labeling is
false or misleading in any particular." Id.
Vol. 8, No. I
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but if it cannot be distinguished from the standard, then it is the same
food, and the label would be misleading if it suggested any differ-
ence.4 This focus on chemical identity is part of the FDA's "science-
based" approach to food labeling, and from this perspective, the de-
cision not to require labels on cloned meat and milk makes perfect
sense. If laboratory tests cannot tell whether meat came from a
cloned or a non-cloned animal, then, under FDA's science-based
approach to labeling, there is no difference. But consumers seem to
want and expect more from labels than merely the identity and quan-
tity of the food.
When the FDA announced that it considered meat and milk from
cloned animals to be indistinguishable from the same products from
non-cloned animals5 and, accordingly, safe to eat,6 it also concluded
that there would be no need to label meat or milk that comes from
clones.7 Consumers, however, want to know whether their meat or
4. See the Lanham (Trademark) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n, which also
applies to advertising claims. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 343(g).
5. ANIMAL CLONING: A DRAFT RISK ASSESSMENT was released December 28,
2006. FDA Press Release, supra note 1. The FDA website no longer has the
Draft Risk Assessment posted. However, there is an FDA news release announc-
ing the Draft Risk Assessment and extensive coverage of the Draft in popular me-
dia. See id.
6. FDA Press Release, supra note I ("The draft risk assessment finds that meat
and milk from clones of adult cattle, pigs and goats, and their offspring, are as safe
to eat as food from conventionally bred animals.").
7. CTR. FOR VETERINARY MED., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY USE OF EDIBLE PRODUCTS FROM ANIMAL CLONES OR
THEIR PROGENY FOR HUMAN FOOD OR ANIMAL FEED 2 (2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cvm/Guidance/guidelinel79.htm. In this Draft Guidance, the
FDA states, "there is no science based reason to recommend additional safe-
guards" because the available studies did not show any risks that are unique to
meat and milk products derived from clones. Id. at 3. A critique of the draft risk
analysis on cloned meat could be the subject of another article. The FDA's rea-
soning is essentially that no risks are known, so there must not be any. But see
DENISE CARUSO, INTERVENTION: CONFRONTING THE REAL RISKS OF GENETIC
ENGINEERING AND LIFE ON A BIOTECH PLANET (2006) (discussing, generally, the
risk analysis of new technology). Caruso points out that "risk isn't about what
scientists know. It's about what they don't know. Risk is about uncertainty." Id.
at 32.
2009
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milk may have come from clones.8 Some are ethically opposed to
cloning. Some aren't sure the products will be safe. Some just say
"yuck." But sixty percent say they want to know.9
Consumers often want information about where their food came
from or about the processes employed in producing it."° The food
identity approach to labeling cannot take process into account unless
the process affects the identity of the food. When the process does
not change the food in any material way, process information on a
label might suggest a difference that does not exist."1 The instinctive
"yuck" to the thought of cloned meat highlights the tension between
consumer preferences, the government's science-based, food-
identity approach, and producers' efforts to differentiate their prod-
ucts.
Part I of this article identifies three functions that labels perform,
outlines the types of information usually required, and introduces the
rule that voluntary label information cannot be misleading. Part H
focuses on process information and its implications. I argue that
there is no truly voluntary labeling when consumers care about a
feature; if some products are labeled, then unlabeled products bear a
de facto label by implication. Partly because of the de facto manda-
tory labeling principle, process labeling has the potential to mislead
consumers. In Part III, I examine some relevant characteristics of
consumers. I argue that not all consumers can be misled by label
information. Consumers who have no preferences or who are very
8. Matthew R. Kain, Comment, Throw Another Cloned Steak on the Barbie:
Examining the FDA's Lack of Authority to Impose Mandatory Labeling Require-
ments for Cloned Beef, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 303, 305-06 (2007). Kain states that
66 percent of American consumers considered cloning animals to be morally
wrong, 63 percent of American consumers would likely not buy food from cloned
animals even if the FDA considered food derived from cloned animals as safe, and
only one-third would currently consider buying meat and milk from cloned ani-
mals without any additional information about cloned food. Id. at 305-06.
9. See FOOD MKTG. INST., FMI BACKGROUNDER: FOOD FROM CLONED ANIMAL
4 (2007), available at http://www.fmi.org/media/bg/Cloning-backgrounder.pdf
(finding 64 percent "uncomfortable" or "very uncomfortable" with cloning).
10. A familiar example of process labeling is the USDA organic seal. The Na-
tional Organic Program regulations provide rules about how food must be grown
or processed. See generally 7 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2009).
11. See, e.g., infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing milk label
claims that the milk comes from cows not treated with bovine growth hormone).
Vol. 8, No. I
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knowledgeable about the labeled feature are not misled by process
labeling. Finally, using labeling of genetically modified (GM) in-
gredients as an example, I suggest that mandatory labeling of some
process information could enhance consumer sovereignty and wel-
fare.
H. GENERAL RULES AND ROLES FOR FOOD LABELS
A. Label Functions
The earliest federal labeling law in this country did not require
any specific label information; rather, the Pure Food and Drugs Act
of 1906 simply prohibited false or misleading statements on food
labels.'" The purpose of this was to prevent deception and to help
consumers make utility- or welfare-maximizing choices.13 Presuma-
bly consumers act in their own best interests, given a choice, by
choosing the option that provides the most satisfaction or utility. 4 A
consumer can get the most utility out of limited dollars to spend on
food 5 only if the consumer has accurate information about the foods
12. See Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 8, 34 Stat. 768, 770 (re-
pealed 1938); see also Frederick H. Degnan, The Food Label and the Right to
Know, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 49, 50 (1997) (stating the purpose of the misbrand-
ing statute was to prevent deception); Peter Barton Hutt, Regulating the Misbrand-
ing of Food, 43 FOOD TECH. 288 (1989), as reprinted in PETER BARTON HUTr &
RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (2d ed.
1991). See generally Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt H, A History of Gov-
ernment Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 39 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 2, 47-53 (1984). For a recounting of the historical context that gave
rise to 1906 Pure Food Act, see James Harvey Young, The Long Struggle for the
1906 Law, FDA CONSUMER, June 1981, at 12, cited in Caroline Smith DeWaal,
Food Safety and Security: What Tragedy Teaches Us About Our 100-Year-Old
Food Laws, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 921, 921 (2007).
13. Degnan, supra note 12, at 50.
14. See Matthew A. Smith & Michael S. McPherson, Nudging for Equality:
Values in Libertarian Paternalism, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 323, 324 (2009) (contain-
ing brief statement of this assumption of behavioral economics).
15. In the recent documentary, KING CORN (ITVS 2007), former Secretary of
Agriculture Earl Butz points out that we now spend only about 16 percent of our
disposable income on food. In earlier times, it was higher. According to a USDA
ERS report, the average household spends something closer to 10 percent of its
disposable income on food. NOEL BLISARD & HAYDEN STEWART, U.S. DEP'T OF
2009
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under consideration. Accordingly, the goal of label information is to
help consumers identify the food products that best match their pref-
erences, thus helping consumers spend wisely. Subsequent legisla-
tion requires additional kinds of information, still aimed at prevent-
ing deception. 16
To this end, label claims perform three primary functions. The
most obvious function is identification. A product's label helps a
consumer know what product is inside the wrapper (if there is a
wrapper). If a consumer has a preference, knowing the identity of a
product obviously enables the consumer to choose the preferred
product. In this context, providing information increases welfare
and increases liberty by allowing consumers to exercise freedom of
choice.'7 Information about food identity is generally neutral or pos-
itive; it helps sales because it helps consumers find the foods they
want. Contrast the informational role with another-warnings.
Unlike product identification, a warning is not neutral. Rather, it
clearly suggests one choice over another. 18 Information about aller-
gens, for example, warns shoppers with food sensitivities or allergies
to avoid products that could cause them harm. 9 Similarly, if an in-
gredient is known to cause cancer, consumers might think twice be-
AGRIC., ECONOMIC INFORMATION BULLETIN 23, FOOD SPENDING BY AMERICAN
HOUSEHOLDS, 2003-04, at iv (2007), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/eib23/eib23.pdf.
16. See, e.g., Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 89-755, 80 Stat.
1296 (1966) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (2006)); Poultry
Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-472); Filled Milk Act, ch. 262, 42 Stat. 1486 (1923)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-64); Federal Meat Inspection Act, ch.
2907, 34 Stat. 1260 (1907) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695).
17. Cf Smith & McPherson, supra note 14, at 330 (providing a definition of
liberty for this purpose: "people should be free to do what they like-and to opt
out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so .... [P]eople should be 'free
to choose."' (quoting RICHARD H. THALER & CASs R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5 (2008))).
18. Some warnings help consumers avoid danger by using the product correctly
rather than avoiding the product altogether. Safe handing instructions are a good
example.
19. Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-282, § 202, 118 Stat. 905,905-06.
Vol. 8, No. I
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fore choosing to consume it.2° A label that indicates the presence of
a known carcinogen provides information that is not neutral.
Some labels that appear neutral on their faces also seem to have a
value-laden impact. The labeled presence of peanuts is a warning to
people with peanut allergies, but it may also be positive information
for people who like peanuts. In some cases, the absence of informa-
tion also acts as a warning, at least for some consumers.21
A third possible function of label information is education for
public health purposes. The mandatory nutrition panel has this func-
tion to some extent.22 It alerts consumers to the importance of nutri-
tion, reminding them that they should care about vitamins and nutri-
ents, and highlighting the important ones.23  Congress has deter-
mined that consumers should want this information.24 In this way,
required nutritional information educates consumers about what their
needs are and helps them identify the products that best meet their
needs. Voluntary health claims on labels also perform this educa-
tional function. For example, a sample health claim for oat bran
reads: "Soluble fiber from foods such as oat bran, as part of a diet
low in saturated fat and cholesterol, may reduce the risk of heart
20. Of course, consumers do consume products known or believed to be detri-
mental to health. Consider cigarettes, for example. Examples of bad-for-us foods
intentionally consumed are harder to find, but consumers do choose food products
that cannot be said to enhance health or that have no nutritional value other than
calories-cotton candy comes to mind.
21. In this regard, see Guillaume P. Gru~re & S.R. Rao, A Review of Interna-
tional Labeling Policies of Genetically Modified Food to Evaluate India's Pro-
posed Rule, 10 AGBIOFORUM 51, 55 (2007) (citing Jill E. Hobbs & William A.
Kerr, Consumer Information, Labeling and International Trade in Agri-Food
Products, 31 FOOD POL'Y 78 (2006)), for the proposition that mandatory labeling
is better than an import ban except when the label acts as a warning, in which case
the result is no genetically-modified products.
22. But see Michael A. McCann, Economic Efficiency and Consumer Choice
Theory in Nutritional Labeling, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1161, 1187 (asserting that a
purpose of the nutrition label, for example, is to warn consumers about overcon-
sumption of certain nutrients).
23. For more on the nutrition panel, see infra notes 28-30 and accompanying
text.
24. See, e.g., Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
535, § 2, 104 Stat. 2353, 2353-57 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §343(q)
(2006)). But see Degnan, supra note 12, at 54 (seeing this as another form of pro-
viding limited identification information).
2009
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disease.,25 This language tells consumers not only that this product
has oat bran, but that this information is significant because reducing
heart disease should matter to them. Without the health claim, the
presence of oat bran in the ingredients list might not be noticeable,
especially to consumers who do not read the ingredients list. One
study showed that consumers did not notice the words "genetically
modified corn" on a candy bar label, but once it was pointed out to
them, it became important, and they modified their behavior. 6 If the
information had been more prominent, perhaps the result would have
been different: the label would have alerted consumers to an issue
they should think about.
All three functions thus help prevent deception and help facilitate
utility-maximizing choices.
B. Mandatory Label Information
The current statute that governs most food labeling issues is the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).27 It requires much of the
information that we are accustomed to seeing on food labels and
specifies formats for those statements. For example, the nutrition
28panel is familiar to most food consumers. While a consumer might
not be able to list all of the nutrients listed in the nutrition panel,
most probably do have a sense that the panel has to be there, and that
it has to include calories, saturated fat, and now trans fat, as well as
sodium and other items,29 but the rule has other requirements too.3"
25. 21 C.F.R. § 101.81(e)(1) (2009).
26. Charles Noussair et al., Do Consumers Not Care About Biotech Foods or Do
They Just Not Read the Labels?, 75 ECON. LETTERs 47 (2002).
27. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399a.
28. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (requiring specific nutrition information such as
the serving size, number of servings per container, the total number of calories,
and the amounts of specified nutrients).
29. See Alvin Schupp et al., Consumer Awareness and Use of Nutrition Labels
On Packaged Fresh Meats: A Pilot Study, J. FOOD DISTRIBUTION REs., July 1998,
at 24, 28 (reporting a high-rate (as high as 78.5 percent) of usage of the nutrition
labels, especially where the nutrient content was not previously known by the
consumer).
30. See Fed. Sec. Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943); see also 21
U.S.C. § 343(e) (requiring "an accurate statement of the quantity of the contents in
terms of weight, measure, or numerical count"); OFFICE OF NuTRITION, LABELING,
Vol. 8, No. I
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Less commonly known is the rule requiring that the label tell you
what the specific food is-not just its brand name, but a description
of the food itself.31 Most consumers probably do not realize that
many foods have "standards of identity"-definitions for each kind
of food-which are actually provided in the regulations.3 2 For ex-
ample, "enriched farina" must contain vitamin B 1, riboflavin, nico-
tinic acid, folic acid, and iron.33 Plain-old "farina" is not enriched at
all.34 In a 1943 case, Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats
Co.,3" the Supreme Court held that farina enriched with only vitamin
D is not "farina" (which does not contain vitamin D), and it is also
not "enriched farina" because it lacks the other substances required
by the federal regulations.3 6 The Quaker Oats company had mar-
keted farina enriched only with vitamin D.37 The label said "Quaker
Farina Wheat Cereal Enriched with Vitamin D.' , 38 The Court held
that the product was misbranded because the label used the terms
AND DIETARY REQUIREMENTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: A FOOD LABELING GUIDE (2008),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/GuidanceD
ocuments/FoodLabelingNutrition/FoodLabelingGuide/default.htm. This food
guide is a non-binding guidance for industry that was revised as recently as April
of 2008.
31. 21 U.S.C. § 343(g); 21 C.F.R. § 101.105 (2009). But see 21 U.S.C. § 341
(excluding "fresh or dried fruits, fresh or dried vegetables, or butter, except that
definitions and standards of identity may be established for avocadoes, canta-
loupes, citrus fruits, and melons").
32. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 101.4(b)(20) ("For purposes of ingredient labeling, the term
'sugar' shall refer to sucrose, which is obtained from sugarcane or sugar beets in
accordance with the provisions of § 184.1854 of this chapter."). See generally id.
pts. 101-181 (including food and "indirect food additives"). The regulations pro-
vide definitions for everything from "nonstandardized breaded composite shrimp
units," to milk. Id. §§ 131.110, 102.55. Even definitions for "indirect food addi-
tives" such as "odorless light petroleum hydrocarbons" may be found. Id. §
178.3650.
33. Id. § 137.305; see Quaker Oats, 318 U.S. at 234-35.
34. 21 C.F.R. § 137.300.
35. 318 U.S. 218. See generally PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG
LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 162-80 (3d ed. 2007) (containing casebook chapter on
food identity standards including an edited version of the Quaker Oats case).
36. Quaker Oats, 318 U.S. at 234-35; see also 21 C.F.R. § 137.300.
37. Quaker Oats, 318 U.S. at 224.
38. Id.
2009
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"farina" and "enriched," and the enrichments did not include all of
the specified nutrients.39 In other words, it was not "farina" because
it was enriched, but it was not "enriched farina" because it was not
enriched enough.
C. Voluntary Label Information
The required information on a label is only part of what we read
at the breakfast table. Most labels also bear voluntary information
usually provided to enhance marketability. For example, the front of
a randomly chosen box of "Mom's Best Naturals" breakfast cereal
claims to have "44 g of whole grain per serving." The front of the
box also lists "no artificial preservatives," "no artificial colors or
flavors," "no hydrogenated or palm oil," "no high fructose corn sy-
rup," and "family-owned for four generations."''4
The FDCA imposes a limitation on all voluntary label claims-
information on a label must be truthful and not misleading. 4, Under
§ 343(a), if the label information is either untrue or misleading, the
food is considered to be "misbranded. ' 42 In other words, the statute
prohibits label claims that are misleading, even if the claims are
true.4 3 As early as 1924, the United States Supreme Court endorsed
39. Id. at 234.
40. A picture of the cereal box is available at http://momsbestnaturals.com/all-
natural-products/sweetened-wheat-fuls.php.
41. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(n), 343(a) (2006).
42. Id. § 343(a)(1). Note that "misbranded" means incorrectly labeled-it has
nothing to do with "brand" names. See id.
43. See id.; Julie Caswell, Should Use of Genetically Modified Organisms Be
Labeled?, 1 AGBIoFORuM 22, 23 (1998) (pointing out that when there are no real
differences between products, label information could actually be deceptive).
When the FDA has specified how a type of claim should read, any label statement
of that type must comply. For example, under 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(b), "A claim
that expressly or implicitly characterizes the level of a nutrient of the type required
to be in nutrition labeling under § 101.9 or under § 101.36 (that is, a nutrient con-
tent claim) may not be made on the label" unless the claim is made in accordance
with applicable regulations. In Public Citizen, Inc. v. Shalala, 932 F. Supp. 13
(D.D.C. 1996), we see the following statement: "For example, a claim about nutri-
tional levels can only be made 'if the characterization of the level made in the
claim uses terms which are defined in regulations of the Secretary."' Id. at 15
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(2)(A)(i)). This case is one in a long line of cases that
discuss whether or not restaurants are exempt from these food-labeling regulations
Vol. 8, No. I
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this aspect of the statute: "Deception may result from the use of
statements not technically false or which may be literally true ....
[The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906]4 was enacted to enable pur-
chasers to buy food for what it really is."45
For example, a food such as applesauce cannot be labeled as
"low fat" without a qualifier such as "a naturally low fat food." A
consumer who prefers to follow a low fat diet could be misled by a
label that says "low fat applesauce," erroneously thinking that other
jars of applesauce that are not labeled "low fat" actually contain a
higher fat product. Applesauce, however, is always low fat-that is
the nature of applesauce. Although "low fat applesauce" might be a
truthful description of the product, it would be misleading for con-
sumers who do not know much about applesauce.
This rule could be termed the "not-misleading rule." The rule
lurks in the background in the case of mandatory labeling; whether
label information could be misleading is one of the considerations
behind new labeling requirements. It surfaces on a case-by-case ba-
sis where voluntary labeling is at issue.
EI. THE NOT-MISLEADING RULE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PROCESS
INFORMATION
A. Process Information
The not-misleading rule is perhaps most relevant in the context
of process information. Sometimes consumers may want, and pro-
ducers may wish to provide, information about the processes by
which a food is produced, even when that information does not say
anything about the "scientific" identity of the food.4 6 In some cases,
and, if so, to what extent. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. New York City Bd.
of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2009).
44. ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938).
45. United States v. Ninety-Five Barrels (More or Less) Alleged Apple Cider
Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438, 443 (1924) (citing United States v. Schider, 246 U.S. 519,
522 (1918); United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409
(1914); United States v. Antikamnia Chem. Co., 231 U.S. 654, 665 (1914)).
46. This information is sometimes called a "credence attribute" because consum-
ers cannot tell the difference by taste or appearance. See ASTRID DANNENBERG ET
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information about process is even required. Process information or
"credence attributes" must simply be believed-there is no way for
consumers to confirm the truth of a process claim because the result-
ing food itself is not changed. For example, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) organic seal, probably the best-known process
designation, means that the food was (or its ingredients were) grown
or produced in compliance with National Organic Program (NOP)
regulations. 47 The NOP regulations require specific production prac-
tices:4 8 rules about process-no pesticides or antibiotics,49 no comin-
gling with non-"organic" products,5° three years of organic crop pro-
duction,5" and so on. Compliance with these processes is rewarded
with the right to use the green and white USDA Organic symbol on
the label even though most organic food is chemically indistinguish-
able from its non-organic counterpart.52
AL., CTR. FOR EUROPEAN ECON. RESEARCH, DISCUSSION PAPER No. 08-029, DOES
MANDATORY LABELING OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD GRANT CONSUMERS
THE RIGHT TO KNOw? EvIDENCE FROM AN ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT (2008), avail-
able at ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp08029.pdf.
47. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, National Organic Program,
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvI.O/NOP (last visited November 22, 2009).
48. See generally 7 C.F.R. pt. 205.
49. Id. § 205.206 (providing a crop pest, weed, and disease management stan-
dard); id. § 205.238(c) (prohibiting certain livestock healthcare practices and cer-
tain medications).
50. Id. § 205.270 (providing organic handling requirements).
51. Id. § 205.202(b) (forbidding the use of prohibited substances from being
applied to land for three years).
52. For some foods, organic production does result in measurable differences.
See Carl K. Winter, Organic Foods: IFT's Latest Scientific Status Summary, FOOD
TECH., Oct. 2006, at 44, available at http://members.ift.org/NR/rdonlyres/
79831BA3-2224-4787-A9CC-A03E837F6148/0/1006organic.pdf. This article
summarizes the findings of the Institute of Food Technologists' study "com-
par[ing] organic and conventional foods with respect to pesticide residues, nutri-
tional components, naturally occurring toxins, and microbiological safety." Id. at
44. The study found that:
[p]esticide residues were 3.2 times more likely to be found in conven-
tional produce than in organic produce according to the [U.S. Department
of Agriculture's Pesticide Data Program] data, 4.8 times more prevalent
in the [California Department of Pesticide Regulation] data, 2.9 times
greater in the [Consumers Union] study, and 4.1 times more likely in an-
other study using Belgian data.
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Other examples include Fair Trade designations,53 the country of
origin of the food,54 or the fact that the food was grown without de-
Id. at 46 (citing Luc Pussemier et al., Chemical Safety of Conventionally and Or-
ganically Produced Foodstuffs: A Tentative Comparison Under Belgian Condi-
tions, 17 FOOD CONTROL 14 (2006)). The study continued by stating that "[m]ost
comprehensive reviews comparing nutrient levels in organic and conventional
foods have been inconclusive, yielding mixed results, with the exception of nitrate
levels, which are typically lower in organic foods." Id. at 47 (citing Diane Bourn
& John Prescott, A Comparison of the Nutritional Value, Sensory Qualities, and
Food Safety of Organically and Conventionally Produced Foods, 42 CRITICAL
REVIEWS FOOD SCI. & NUTRITION 1 (2002); Katrin Woese et al., A Comparison of
Organically and Conventionally Grown Foods-Results of a Review of the Rele-
vant Literature, 74 J. SCI. FOOD & AGRIC. 281 (1997); Virginia Worthington, Nu-
tritional Quality of Organic Versus Conventional Fruits, Vegetables, and Grains,
7 J. ALTERNATIVE & COMPLEMENTARY MED. 161 (2001)). However, it is noted
that "[m]any recent studies ... have demonstrated that some plant secondary me-
tabolites such as organic acids and polyphenols are produced at greater levels un-
der organic growing conditions." Id. The complete article, Carl K. Winter &
Sarah F. Davis, Organic Foods, 71 J. FOOD Sci. RI 17 (2006), is available at
http://members.ift.org/NR/rdonlyres/A5367812-A6CF-46C0-80B9-
B1EF39AOBCC4/0/OrganicFood.pdf. See also Danny K. Asami et al., Compari-
son of the Total Phenolic and Ascorbic Acid Content of Freeze-Dried and Air-
Dried Marionberry, Strawberry, and Corn Grown Using Conventional, Organic,
and Sustainable Agricultural Practices, 51 J. AGRIC. & FOOD CHEM. 1237, 1237
(2003), available at http://mitchell.ucdavis.edu/publications/OrgConAEM.pdf
("Statistically higher levels of [polyphenols] were consistently found in organi-
cally and sustainably grown foods as compared to those produced by conventional
agricultural practices."); Woese, supra, at 290 (finding higher nitrate levels and
pesticide residues in conventionally-grown foods generally but "no major differ-
ences" found in nutritional quality between conventional and organic foods); Wor-
thington, supra, at 161 (finding that "[o]rganic crops contained significantly more
vitamin C, iron, magnesium, and phosphorus and significantly less nitrates than
conventional crops"). Interestingly, the Woese study found that "[i]n feed selec-
tion experiments it has been shown that animals differentiate between foods from
the various agricultural systems and prefer organic produce." Woese, supra, at
290; see also Catharine Paddock, Organic Food is More Nutritious Say EU Re-
searchers, MED. NEWS TODAY, Oct. 29, 2007,
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/86972.php.
53. Probably the most well known of the fair-trade designations is the TransFair
USA Fair Trade Certified label, available at http://www.transfairusa.org (last vis-
ited Nov. 3, 2009). However, there are other fair-trade certifiers such as FLO-
CERT, which certifies and regulates for the Fairtrade Labeling Organization
(FLO) International, available at http://www.flo-cert.net/flo-cert/main.php?lg=en
(last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
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stroying any rain forests." Similarly, the presence or absence of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in a food product is process
information,56 as is the fact that chickens were or were not treated
with antibiotics.51 The federal government does not regulate all
54. See U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, Country of
Origin Labeling, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/cool (last visited Sept. 15,
2009). The website provides a brief history of country of origin labeling:
The 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills amended the Agricultural Marketing
Act of 1946 to require retailers to notify their customers of the country of
origin of muscle cut and ground meats including beef, veal, lamb, pork,
chicken, and goat meat; wild and farm-raised fish and shellfish; perish-
able agricultural commodities (fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables);
peanut, pecans, and macadamia nuts; and ginseng. On October 5, 2004,
the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) published an interim final rule
(IFR) for fish and shellfish (69 FR 59708) that went into effect on April
5, 2005. Legislation delayed the implementation of mandatory country of
origin labeling (COOL) for all covered commodities except fish and
shellfish until September 30, 2008. On August 1, 2008, AMS published
an interim final rule for all remaining covered commodities (73 FR
45106). On January 15, 2009 AMS published a final rule for all covered
commodities combined (74 FR 2658) which became effective on March
16, 2009.
Id.
55. See Rainforest Alliance, Sustainable Agriculture Introduction,
http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/agriculture.cfm?id=main (last visited Nov. 3,
2009). The website states that "Rainforest Alliance Certified farms have reduced
environmental footprints, are good neighbors to human and wild communities and
are often integral parts of regional conservation initiatives." Id.
56. See Moira Dean et al., Moral Concerns and Consumer Choice of Fresh and
Processed Organic Foods, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2088, 2094-95 (2008)
(finding inter alia concerns about chemicals used in production, the affects of
production of that food product on the environment, and having "trust" in the way
the product was produced as important for those that bought certified organic
foods-an example of a food product exhibiting a process label); Mario F. Teisl et.
al., Labeling Genetically Modified Foods: How Do US Consumers Want to See It
Done?, 6 AGBIoFORUM 48 (2003); see also JAMES L. VETrER, FOOD LAWS AND
REGULATIONS 11(I 1996); Samia N. Rodriguez, Food Labeling Requirements, in 1
FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION 237, 254 (Robert P. Brady et al. eds.,
1997).
57. United States Standards for Livestock and Meat Marketing Claims, 67 Fed.
Reg. 79,552, 79,554 (Dec. 30, 2002) ("Antibiotic-free" is not approved for use by
the USDA. "No antibiotics administered," "no detectable antibiotic residue," and
"raised without antibiotics" are acceptable for use.); FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL RAISING CLAIMS IN THE LABELING OF
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process labels, but when it does, the regulating agency is likely to be
the USDA.58 In addition to overseeing the NOP, the USDA is also
responsible for country-of-origin labeling rules as well as irradiation
and other agricultural production processes and their labels.5 9 In
contrast, the FDA's authority stems from the FDCA whose labeling
provisions are aimed only at preventing economic deception by pro-
viding accurate information about food identity.60 For the most part,
then, the FDA does not require process information.
Some process information, however, is actually required. For
example, meat and fish, and now produce, must be labeled with the
country of origin. 6' This information tells us nothing about the food
MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS 15 (2008), available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PPT/ClaimsPoretta_101408.ppt ("FSIS has decided to
initiate a review of its policies for evaluating and approving animal raising claims.
To facilitate this review, the Agency published a Federal Register notice on Octo-
ber 10, 2008, to solicit public input."); FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., MEAT AND POULTRY LABELING TERMS 3 (2006), available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/Meat-andPoultry-Labeling-Terms.pdf ("The
terms 'no antibiotics added' may be used on labels for meat or poultry products if
sufficient documentation is provided by the producer to the Agency demonstrating
that the animals were raised without antibiotics."). While the "no antibiotics
added" label may be voluntarily used, it may not be used if it is false or mislead-
ing. See Press Release, Food Safety & Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
Statement by Under Secretary for Food Safety Dr. Richard Raymond Regarding
the Tyson Foods, Inc. Raised Without Antibiotics Label Claim Withdrawal (June
3, 2008), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News &_Events/
NR_060308_01/index.asp (stating that the FSIS, upon finding out that Tyson was
regularly administering antibiotics to its chickens, was rescinding labels that
claimed that the product was "raised without antibiotics"); see also Sanderson
Farms, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. 2008) (claim of
false advertising on label about being "raised without antibiotics").
58. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
59. See infra notes 63, 65-68 and accompanying text.
60. 21 U.S.C. § 341; see Dean et al., supra note 56, at 2094-95 (finding inter
alia concerns about chemicals used in production, the affects of production of that
food product on the environment, and having "trust" in the way the product was
produced as important for those that bought certified organic foods-an example
of a food product exhibiting a process label); Teisl et al., supra note 56; see also
VETrER, supra note 56, at 11; Rodriguez, supra note 56, in 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF
LAW AND REGULATION 237, 254 (Robert P. Brady et al. eds., 1997).
61. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, supra note 54.
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itself (such as whether the cow died of mad cow disease),62 merely
where it came from. Moreover, fish that is farm-raised must also be
so-labeled, 63 a designation that primarily provides process informa-
tion, but may provide some food identity information as well.64
62. See GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN
LABELING FOR FOODS 5-6 (2003), available at
http://lugar.senate.gov/services/pdf-crs/countryfoLorigin.pdf.
Proponents of the new program have long argued that U.S. consumers
have a fight to know the origin of their food, particularly during a period
when food imports are increasing. Such information is particularly im-
portant to consumers whenever specific health and safety problems arise
that may be linked to imported foods, proponents add. They cite as one
prominent example concerns about the safety of some foreign beef due to
outbreaks of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or "mad cow dis-
ease"). In May 2003, the discovery of a single cow with BSE in Canada
prompted U.S. officials to impose a ban on all Canadian ruminant and
ruminant product imports. Complicating matters has been a demand by
Japan for verification that all imports of U.S. beef come from animals
born, raised, and slaughtered in the United States. These developments
have been used by some COOL supporters to argue the need for country
labeling.
Id. More recently, many U.S. consumers have been concerned about food from
China because of some melamine incidents. See, e.g., Max Thornsberry, Country-
of-Origin Labeling More Important Tool Than Ever for U.S. Consumers,
CATILEMEN'S NEWSL., July 2007, at 7 ("The need for COOL is once again driven
home by the [FDA's] discovery that the tainted Chinese feed additives were la-
beled as wheat gluten and rice protein, but actually were ordinary wheat flour
illegally mixed with melamine."); George Reynolds, Country-of-Origin Labeling
Is Anti-Import, Claims Industry Body, FOOD PRODUCTION DAILY, May 29, 2007,
http://www.foodproductiondaily.com/Supply-Chain/Country-of-origin-labeling-is-
anti-import-claims-industry-body ("Fears have arisen over meat and poultry im-
ports ... because of outbreaks of avian flu, and more recently the discovery of
melamine in feed.").
63. "The notice of country of origin for wild fish and farm-raised fish shall dis-
tinguish between wild fish and farm-raised fish." 7 U.S.C.A. § 1638a(a)(3)(B)
(West Supp. 2009).
64. In the case of farmed salmon, for example, artificial colorant is added to the
feed and is present in the final fish product. See Donna Byrne, Disclosing the
Potentially Dangerous Dyes that Make Gray Salmon Pink: The California Su-
preme Court Holds that Actions to Enforce the State's Food Labeling Law Are Not
Preempted by Federal Law, FINDLAW, Feb. 18, 2008,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20080218_byme.html.
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Irradiation is another process that must be labeled even though
the food itself is essentially unaltered. Food can be irradiated to
eliminate bacterial contamination. 65  According to Debra Strauss,
when the FDA approved ionizing radiation, it also required labeling
"because such processing is a material fact" that must be disclosed to
prevent deception. 66 The FDA found, however, that irradiation actu-
ally can change food properties without changing the appearance of
the food.67 The irradiated food may appear not to have been proc-
essed at all, and this would be misleading. If food properties are
changed, then labeling the food as "irradiated" does convey some-
thing about the food itself, and not merely about the process.
Oddly enough, some processes are permitted even though the re-
sult is intentionally misleading. For example, meat and fish are of-
ten packaged with carbon monoxide in order to prolong the color of
fresh meat.68 The purpose of this practice can only be to make the
meat more attractive to consumers by helping it stay red longer.69
Informed consumers know that the "use-by" date is supposed to be
the best indicator of freshness, and they will not buy food after its
65. Kim M. Morehouse, Food Irradiation: The Treatment of Foods with Ionizing
Radiation, FOOD TESTING & ANALYSIS, June/July 1998, at 9, 32, 35.
66. See Debra M. Strauss, The International Regulation of Genetically Modified
Organisms: Importing Caution into the U.S. Food Supply, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
167, 184 (2006) (citing Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of
Food, 21 C.F.R. § 179.26 (2003)); see also Degnan, supra note 12, at 52-53 (cit-
ing Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51 Fed. Reg.
13,376 (Apr.'18, 1986) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 179); 21 C.F.R. § 179.26(c)
(1996)).
67. Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 13,390.
68. Diminished Capacity: Can the FDA Assure the Safety and Security of Our
Nation's Food Supply-Part IV-Deception in Labeling: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Daniel Engeljohn, Deputy Assistant Ad-
ministrator, Office of Policy, Program, and Employee Development, Food Safety
and Inspection Service), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/im-
ages/stories/Documents/Hearings/PDF/1 I 0-oi-hrg. 111 307.Engeljohn-
Testimony.pdf ("Carbon monoxide is used to stabilize the color pigment of meat,
when it is red and, therefore, most appealing to consumers.").
69. Id.
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freshness date has come and gone.7" Informed consumers also know
that smell is a better indicator of freshness than color.7 So the prac-
tice of color enhancement with carbon monoxide should have no
effect on the purchase decisions of informed consumers. Neverthe-
less, most shoppers evidently interpret bright color as an indication
of freshness in meat. The use of carbon monoxide predictably would
influence uninformed consumers to buy with less regard to the use-
by date or the smell of the product.72 In other words, the practice
itself seems intended to mislead consumers about the freshness of
the product.
Carbon monoxide does not change the meat itself, however, and
does not preserve its freshness; it merely keeps the color from
changing. If the meat itself were unchanged, then presumably the
use of carbon monoxide would not be mandatory label information.
B. Voluntary Labeling Means De Facto Mandatory Labeling
Although most process information is voluntary, process labeling
becomes mandatory, in a sense, if the feature in question has positive
and negative marketing values. For example, if some foods are la-
beled as USDA organic, the consumer can assume that unlabeled
foods are not "organic." The USDA organic symbol has positive
marketing value, so presumably qualifying products will be labeled.
Logically, then unlabeled products must have been produced with
70. But see Letter from Chris Waldrop, Consumer Fed'n of Am., et. al. to U.S.
Representative 2 (Jan. 18, 2004) (citing Seeing Red: Spoiled Meat May Look
Fresh, CONSUMER REP., July 2006, available at
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/consumer-protection/consumer-interest/meat-
treated-with-carbon-monoxide-spoiled-meat-may-look-fresh-7-06/overview/
0607_spoiled-meaLov.htm (finding that some meat was spoiled before the "use
by" date)), available at http://www.whistleblower.org/ doc/Janu I8.pdf.
71. See Letter from John D. Dingell, U.S. Representative, et al. to Michael 0.
Leavitt, U.S. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. 2 (Mar. 30, 2006) available at
http://archives.energycommerce.house.gov/Press_109/109-
Itr.Leavitt%2033006%20meat%20safety.pdf.
72. Id. Consumers that are aged or otherwise impaired so that they are unable to
see the small print on the label or unable to smell for off odors, may be misled by
the color of the meat, which is the only indicator left. Id. (stating further that stud-
ies completed by the meat industry have found that the primary characteristic used
by consumers to determine freshness of meat is the color).
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"conventional" methods and do not qualify for the organic sticker.
Similarly, many consumers would regard "wild" salmon as superior
to farm-raised salmon.73 The "wild" label usually has positive va-
lence-it is a positive label when applied to fish, salmon in particu-
lar, and wild salmon typically sells for more than farm-raised
salmon.74 Until recently, labeling of farm-raised salmon was manda-
tory, but labeling of wild salmon was not.7 5 There is no need to re-
quire positive information-producers provide it voluntarily because
it differentiates the product and may even provide a price premium.
But the presence of positive information on some products may also
serve as a warning about unlabeled products. If wild fish is good,
then there must be something bad about farm-raised fish. If "no
GMOs" is worth mentioning, then GMOs must be bad. If milk from
cows not treated with recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST) is
worth boasting about, then rBST must be bad. So in a sense, there is
no truly voluntary labeling. Once some producers use a label, other
products bear a de facto label in the opposite direction.
A decision to require labeling of a "negative" process character-
istic, accordingly, has marketing implications for all products. Per-
haps it is appropriate that the FDA's focus is narrowly on the chemi-
cal identity of the food. The result is that most process information
is not required. The FDA did not require labeling to show that meat
or milk came from a clone or its progeny, or to show that milk came
from cows treated with rBST, or to disclose the presence of GMOs.
These decisions were probably correct given the FDA's focus.
Process information has the potential to suggest a material difference
in the food itself even when there is no such difference.
Because of the de facto mandatory nature of voluntary labeling,
however, a second question arises: should process information be
prohibited altogether? Of course, in some cases the warning func-
tion is intentional. In California, foods containing substances known
to be carcinogenic must be labeled as such.76 In these intentional
73. See generally Byrne, supra note 64.
74. The price premium may go in the opposite direction for other kinds of fish.
75. Under the COOL regulations, fish and shellfish subject to COOL must also
be labeled wild and/or farm-raised. 7 C.F.R. § 60.200 (2009).
76. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2006) ("No person in the
course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual
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warning situations, labeling is either mandatory or at least regu-
lated.77 For voluntary information that may serve as a warning,
however, producers decide for themselves whether and how to pro-
vide the label information. When information is deemed to be nega-
tive or seems likely to be understood as a warning, producers under-
standably prefer not to provide it. Information that provides a warn-
ing is clearly negative. If an ingredient is known to cause cancer, for
example, consumers might prefer to avoid it. A label that indicates
the presence of a known carcinogen, then, provides negative infor-
mation and functions as a warning. Other warnings, such as allergy
information are only warnings to some consumers, but certainly are
negative information for those consumers.78
When the unlabeled feature is somehow perceived to be inferior,
producers would understandably prefer not to bring the feature to the
attention of consumers. But the de facto mandatory nature of volun-
tary labeling means that consumers can identify those products pro-
duced with conventional methods, those animal products that might
come from clones, and those products that contain GMOs, even if
the label does not point out these characteristics. Producers of prod-
ucts with "negative" features have an incentive to encourage the
prohibition of even voluntary process labels.
The possibility of actually prohibiting truthful process informa-
tion has been playing out around the bovine growth hormone issue
for some time. In 1993, the FDA approved rBST for use in dairy
to a chemical known ... to cause cancer."); id. § 25249.11 (f) (providing that the
warnings can and should be provided on labels by the producer).
77. See, e.g., Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004 §
203(a), 21 U.S.C. § 343(w) (2006) (requiring labeling of eight major allergens).
78. Logically, there could be voluntary negative labels, but these generally do
not exist. For example, a label that indicates that the milk is from cows that were
treated with recombinant bovine growth hormone (rBGH), or that claims the prod-
uct contains genetically engineered soy, or that the meat is from a cloned animal,
would be voluntary labels, but we do not see such labels. The negative informa-
tion is not required, and the positive information generally is not prohibited. For
example, some products bear a small white box with black print stating that no
GMOs were used. The positive information is available for consumers who look
for it, but the negative information hides in the background. This is the labeling
scenario that intrigues me most.
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cows. 7 9 rBST is a genetically engineered hormone that promotes
increased milk production.80 According to the product website, it
"continues to prove itself to be an effective management tool that
helps dairy producers, both large and small, improve their opera-
tions, lower their cost for producing high quality milk[,] and achieve
higher profitability."81  It mimics a cow's natural hormones, so it
does not harm the cow.82 But the increased lactation does tend to
79. Animal Drugs, Feeds, and Related Products; Sterile Sometribove Zinc Sus-
pension, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,946, 59,946 (Nov. 12, 1993) (codified as amended at 21
C.F.R. §§ 510.600, 522.2112); Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA
Approves New Animal Drug Sometribove (Nov. 5, 1993) Bovine somatotropin is
a naturally produced growth hormone (in a cow) that controls milk production.
Recombinant bovine somatotropin is a genetically engineered hormone-
recombinant means that genetic material has been recombined. rBST is injected in
cows to increase milk production. rBST is often referred to as rBGH.
80. See Press Release, Monsanto Co., Eli Lilly and Company to Acquire Mon-
santo's POSILAC Brand Dairy Product and Related Business (Aug. 20, 2008),
available at http://monsanto.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=629.
POSILAC bovine somatotropin is an FDA-approved animal pharmaceu-
tical used by U.S. dairy farmers to increase productivity. Since it was
first sold in the United States in 1994, POSILAC has become the coun-
try's leading dairy animal supplement. POSILAC safely increases pro-
ductivity of dairy cows thereby allowing family farm owners to more eas-
ily provide for their family and employees, reinvest in their farms, and
conserve resources like land, water and energy. Over the past 14 years,
more than a half billion units of POSILAC have been successfully and
safely used by tens of thousands of dairy producers on millions of cows
to produce wholesome, nutritious, safe and affordable milk and dairy
products.
Id.; see also Press Release, Monsanto Co., FDA Approves POSILAC Production
at Monsanto's Augusta Facility (Mar. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Press Release, FDA
Approves POSILAC Production] (on file with author), available at
http://monsanto.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item= 109&printable (stating
that POSILAC is used to "safely enhance[] milk production," "improve the effi-
ciency and profitability of [dairy] operations," and to give dairy farmers "addi-
tional economic security by increasing the return on their investment").
81. Elanco, POSILAC Product Page, http://www.elanco.us/products/posilac.htm
(last visited Aug. 28, 2009).
82. Press Release, FDA Approves POSILAC Production, supra note 80 (stating
that POSILAC is used to "safely enhance[] milk production," "improve the effi-
ciency and profitability of [dairy] operations," and to give dairy farmers "addi-
tional economic security by increasing the return on their investment").
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make cows vulnerable to infections,83 and cows that are treated with
rBST are also likely to be treated with more antibiotics. 4
rBST is added to the cow, not the milk, so in theory, the milk it-
self is not affected. There are those who claim otherwise, 85 but the
FDA says it cannot tell the difference. 86 We should assume, for sake
83. See I.R. Dohoo et al., A Meta-Analysis Review of the Effects of Recombinant
Bovine Somatotropin (pt. 1), 67 CANADIAN J. VETERINARY RES. 241, 247, 249
(2003), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=
280708&blobtype=pdf (finding that while "the overall effect of rBST was to pro-
duce an increase in 3.5% fat-corrected milk of approximately 4.4 kg per day," it
"reduced the body condition of cows"); id. (pt. 2) at 252-64, available at
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=280709&blobtype=pdf
(finding that rBST: increased the risk of clinical mastitis by approximately 25%
during the treatment period, increased the risk of a cow failing to conceive by
approximately 40%, and increased the risk of a cow developing clinical signs of
lameness by 50%). See generally Scientific Comm. on Animal Health and Animal
Welfare, Report on Animal Welfare Aspects of the Use of Bovine Somatotropin
(Mar. 10, 1999), available at http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/scah/out2len.pdf
(reporting on, inter alia, reproductive problems, leg and foot disorders, and masti-
tis in dairy cows as a result of being injected with rBST).
84. Increased incidents of mastitis (an infection of the udder) will likely result in
higher rates of treatment with antibiotics.
85. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
REPORT ON THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S REVIEW OF THE SAFETY OF
RECOMBINANT BOVINE SOMATOTROPIN (2009), http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVet-
erinary/SafetyHealth/ProductSafetylnformation/ucmI 30321 .htm [hereinafter
FDA, SAFETY OF RBST] ("It may be calculated, based upon consumption of 1.5
liter of milk per day, by a 10 kg child, with a concentration of approximately 5
micrograms (rtg: 10-6) rbST per liter of milk, that children are exposed to 7.5
gig/kg/day." (footnote omitted)). The report goes on to say that this is not of con-
cern because "bGH and rbGH are biologically indistinguishable" and levels of
rBGH several hundred times stronger than this were needed in order to see an
immunological response in rats. Id. In spite of being "biologically indistinguish-
able," the concern about the presence of rBGH in milk products is evidenced by
the consumer demand for rBGH-free products.
86. See Degnan, supra note 12, at 58 (citing Animal Drugs, Feeds, and Related
Products; Sterile Sometribove Zinc Suspension, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,946 (Nov. 12,
1993) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. §§ 510.600, 522.2112)) (explaining that
in approving rBST, the FDA concluded that dairy products from treated herds
were indistinguishable from products from untreated herds); see also Int'l Dairy
Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The United States Food
and Drug Administration has determined that there is no significant difference
between milk from treated and untreated cows."); EXPERT PANEL ON HUMAN
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of argument, that the milk really is indistinguishable from milk from
non-treated cows. Accordingly (and predictably), there is no manda-
tory labeling requirement.87
Nevertheless, some consumers want to know whether their milk
comes from treated cows or untreated cows. Consumers want this
information for a variety of reasons. For example, some consumers
prefer not to consume any foods produced with genetically engi-
neered inputs.88 Others may feel that the evidence of safety was not
conclusive enough when rBST was approved.89 Some may have
worried that the hormone itself would appear in their milk.90 For
whatever reason, when the FDA approved rBST treatment, a market
for milk from cows that had not been treated soon came into exis-
tence and still exists today. 9'
Although the FDA did not require rBST labeling, the State of
Vermont promptly passed legislation requiring that retail milk prod-
ucts from treated cows be so-labeled.92 The required label informa-
SAFETY OF RBST, HEALTH CANADA, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS OF CANADA (1999), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-
mps/vet/issues-enjeux/rbst-stbr/reprcpsc-rap-crmcc final-a-eng.php ("When
cows receive the recommended doses of rbST, the content of bST (measured as
natural plus recombinant somatotropin) in milk does not increase." (citing Paul P.
Groenewegen et al., Bioactivity of Milk from bST-Treated Cows, 120 J. NUTRITION
514 (1990))).
87. Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from
Cows that Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59
Fed. Reg. 6,279, 6,280 (Feb. 10, 1994).
88. Teisl, supra note 56, at 49.
89. FDA, SAFETY OF RBST, supra note 85 (citing the desire of public interest
and consumer groups to have the studies reviewed to see if the findings that sug-
gest that there is no harmful impact of rBGH on milk).
90. See id.
91. See Tirtha Dhar & Jeremy D. Foltz, Milk by Any Other Name...: Consumer
Benefits from Labeled Milk 18 (Food Sys. Research Group, Working Paper No. 2,
2003), available at http://www.aae.wisc.edu/fsrg/working-papers.htm (finding
that "consumers pay significantly more for" milk marketed as rBST-free).
92. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2754 (Supp. 1997) (repealed 1998); see Int'l Dairy
Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding in favor of the
dairy manufacturers that challenged the constitutionality of VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6,
§ 2754(c) on First Amendment grounds). In 1994 Vermont "enacted a statute
requiring that '[i]f rBST has been used in the production of milk or a milk product
2009
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tion would have been truthful,9 3 but proponents of rBST objected to
the labeling requirement. The statute was struck down on First
Amendment grounds; the court saw the non-treated language as "the
functional equivalent of a warning."94
While rBST labeling is not mandatory, some products do bear a
label stating that rBST was not used. The voluntary labeling of
some products creates a negative "label" on other products. Con-
sumers who see some milk cartons labeled as not from treated cows
may interpret the absence of such a label as an indication that a dairy
product does come from treated cows. Since the use of rBST is seen
as negative, this is a marketing challenge for dairies that use rBST as
well as for the makers of rBST. Accordingly, the Monsanto Com-
pany, a well-known agricultural technology corporation, has tried
over the years to bring about a prohibition of the non-treated label
language.95
In 1994, the FDA published interim guidance on the labeling of
milk products from treated or non-treated COWS. 9 6 While the guid-
ance does not require specific language, it emphasizes the rule that
for retail sale in this state, the retail milk or milk product shall be labeled as
such."' Id. (alteration in original).
93. A label stating that rBST had been used in the production of the milk is true
when rBST has been used in the production of that milk.
94. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n, 92 F.3d at 73.
95. See Shawn Dell Joyce, Deciphering Labels, HILL COUNTRY TIMES (Spring
Branch, Tex.), Nov. 11, 2009, available at http://www.hillcountrytimes.coml
print-this-story.asp?smenu=140&sdetail=2729 ("Monsanto is suing the Food and
Drug Administration to remove the [rBST] label from the marketplace.").
96. Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from
Cows that Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59
Fed. Reg. 6,279, 6,280 (Feb. 10, 1994).
[The] FDA believes such misleading implications could best be
avoided by the use of accompanying information that puts the statement
in a proper context. Proper context could be achieved in a number of dif-
ferent ways. For example, accompanying the statement "from cows not
treated with rbST" with the statement that "No significant difference has
been shown between milk derived from rbST-treated and non-rbST-
treated cows" would put the claim in proper context. Proper context
could also be achieved by conveying the firm's reasons (other than safety
or quality) for choosing not to use milk from cows treated with rbST, as
long as the label is truthful and nonmisleading.
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labeling must not be misleading under FDCA § 403(a). 97 Milk pro-
ducers who wish to label their products as those derived from non-
treated cows are advised under the rule to provide the context for
their statements.98 Although the FDA suggested language such as:
"No significant difference has been shown between milk derived
from rbST-treated and non-rbST-treated cows[,]" 99 the Interim Guid-
ance explained that this language is not actually required and other
contextualizing statements might suffice.'0°  The Federal Trade
Commission also cited the Interim Guidance when it considered the
same issue in a 2007 response to Monsanto.' ' As a practical matter,
nearly all producers provide some version of the "no significant dif-
ference" statement.
C. Process Information and the Not Misleading Rule
Consumers want process information and in some instances have
applied enough pressure to win mandatory labeling rules, such as
country-of-origin labeling. Even though process information is not
required, it has not been prohibited, despite industry efforts. How-
ever, process information may collide with the not-misleading rule.
Why do consumers reject cloning? Do they think the meat will be
radioactive? Do they think the milk will be green? Do they really
imagine that they will be able to tell the difference? Under the not-
misleading rule, a label that reads "Not a Clone" could be misleading
unless some of the above sentiments prove to be true. If the clone
product proves to be the same, however, then its method of produc-
tion is irrelevant, and therefore should not be used for product differ-
entiation and price premium.
97. See id.; see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 403(a), 21 U.S.C. §
343(a) (2006).
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Adver. Practices, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, to Jodie Z. Bernstein & Dana B. Rosenfeld (Aug. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/070821monsanto.pdf (declining Monsanto's
request to institute enforcement action against milk companies with rBST-free
labels).
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But perhaps when consumers think about food, they think about
more than just the chemical "identity" of that food. Even if food
products from cloned animals are the same as those from non-clones,
some consumers disapprove of the cloning process itself.'0 2 Simi-
larly, even if all the milk is the same, some consumers disapprove of
rBST as a process component and prefer to buy milk from cows that
were not treated. The process by which the milk was produced is
what matters to them, even if the final product is not changed.'0 3
The examples above notwithstanding, most process information
is voluntary, and accurate statements about process are allowable
even though the food they adorn is not distinguishable from similar
food. A well-known example is the USDA Organic label, which is
won through specific production practices,"° and is permissible even
though most organic food is chemically indistinguishable from its
non-organic counterpart.' 5 Similarly, the presence of GMOs in a
food product is voluntary label information, as is a label indicating
whether chickens were or were not treated with antibiotics.' 6 Are
process labels such as the USDA Organic symbol and non-GMO
statements such as "no antibiotics," or "no rBST" misleading? Does
process information imply that a product itself is superior to its unla-
beled counterparts?
One argument against allowing process information on labels is
that it presents the potential for fraud because labeling regulations
are only as good as the possibility of enforcement.'0 7 If the finished
102. NANCY FARMER, THE HOUSE OF THE SCORPION (2002) is an entertaining and
chilling picture of where cloning could go. In this Newberry Award-winning
novel, human clones are raised to produce replacement organs for transplantation.
Id. The main character is the clone being grown for his brain. Id.
103. But see Margaret Sova McCabe, Got Controversy? Milk Does, 13 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 475, 478-79 (2008) (arguing that consumers prefer milk from untreated
cows because of safety concerns due in part to the increased use of antibiotics).
104. 7 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2009).
105. For some foods, organic production does result in measurable differences.
See Winter, supra note 52, at 48.
106. United States Standards for Livestock and Meat Marketing Claims, 67 Fed.
Reg. 79,552, 79,554 (Dec. 30, 2002).
107. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-597, FOOD LABELING: FDA
NEEDS TO BETTER LEVERAGE RESOURCES, IMPROVE OVERSIGHT, AND
EFFECTIVELY USE AVAILABLE DATA TO HELP CONSUMERS SELECT HEALTHY
FOODS (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08597.pdf ("FDA's
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products differ, enforcement of labeling information is quite feasi-
ble-all that is needed is some product testing to ensure that the box
actually contains what the label maintains that it does."' 8 When the
oversight and enforcement efforts have not kept pace with the growing number of
food firms. As a result, FDA has little assurance that companies comply with food
labeling laws and regulations for, among other things, preventing false or mislead-
ing labeling."). Within the Department of Health and Human Services, the FDA is
responsible for enforcing federal food labeling requirements, in accordance with
the FDCA. Id. at 1. The "FDA oversees industry compliance with the food label-
ing requirements" through the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
(CFSAN). Id. at 2. The FDA's Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA) is responsible
for performing inspections and enforcement actions. Id. The FDA has various
ways to respond when food-labeling violations are found. Id. The FDA may re-
quest a voluntary recall or send a warning letter. Id. If the violation is not cor-
rected the FDA may seize the food product or enjoin the violator from continuing
to act in a violating manner. Id. For imported food, the FDA may issue an import
refusal to keep food from entering the U.S. if there is a labeling violation. Id. at 2-
3; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 (2006) (discussing enforcement options).
108. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FISCAL YEAR 2010 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEES 189-216 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/ down-
loads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM 153559.pdf
This description of ORA activities provides one with an understanding, both of
how much testing is done and how much importance is given to testing for accu-
racy in food labeling.
The laboratory analytical function of ORA is conducted in 13 labora-
tories located throughout the country. The ORA laboratory structure con-
sists of five Regional Labs, four District Labs, and four Specialty Labs.
Regional Labs are large general purpose laboratories that participate in
most major analytical programs. District Labs participate in several ana-
lytical programs and have specialties in specific areas. Specialty labs
conduct analyses in specific areas of laboratory service including; engi-
neering, biological, and chemical hazards associated with medical de-
vices, electronic products, and radiopharmaceuticals; and, forensic analy-
sis of samples related to criminal activities that fall under FDA jurisdic-
tion; including drug counterfeiting.
Id. at 194. However, the ORA claims that they have "improved lab facility usage
overall and efficiency in analytical response to emergencies, outbreak, consumer
complaints as well as routine import and domestic sample collections." Id. In a
2005 letter to then-Commissioner Eschenbach, representatives of the Center for
Science in the Public Interest voiced their concerns for the low priority that label-
ing violations are given by the ORA and the FDA. Letter from Michael F. Jacob-
son et al., Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, to Andrew von Eschenbach, Acting
Comm'r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Oct. 27, 2005) (citing FOOD & DRUG
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finished products cannot be distinguished, however, enforcement is
more costly because it requires monitoring the production system.'
°9
So in the case of process information, there may be an increased
possibility of fraudulent label claims.
The focus here, however, is quite different; when one label bears
a truthful claim about process, all products are effectively labeled
with respect to that process. If a processed-salmon package indi-
cates that the salmon is "wild," a consumer who is paying attention
would reasonably assume that an unmarked package contains farmed
salmon. If milk is labeled as derived from untreated cows, then all
milk not bearing this label can be assumed to come from treated
cows. Because of the de facto mandatory nature of voluntary label-
ing, consumers may interpret process information as a claim about
the identity of both the labeled and unlabeled products.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSUMERS
Information requires an audience, which plays an important role
in the transfer of knowledge. " The effect of information depends
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FIELD MANAGEMENT
DIRECTIVE 119: CONSUMER PRODUCTS COMPLAINT SYSTEM (1994), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/FieldManagementDirectives/ucm061481.ht
m), available at http://www.cspinet.orglnew/pdf/misleading-labels-letter.pdf
(remarking on the lack of ability to enter a complaint for a labeling violation).
109. See Gru~re & Rao, supra note 21, at 52-53. One of the criticisms leveled
against rBST absence labeling is that there is no way to tell from the finished
product if the label is truthful or not, which makes untruthful labeling difficult to
detect.
110. See generally JAMES M. NEHILEY, THE ROLE OF THE AUDIENCE IN THE
COMMUNICATION PROCESS I (Fla. Dep't of Agric. Educ. & Commc'n, AEC 317,
1997), available at http://www.okcareertech.org/CIMC/titles/lifeskills-
comm/Resources/CommUnit3/FLaudiencerole.pdf ("Without the audience there is
no real need to communicate. Does a tree falling in the desert make a sound?
Who cares?"); Geoff Hart, "Prescriptive " Audience Analysis: Moving Beyond the
Purely Descriptive, TECHWR-L, Sept. 10, 2007, http://www.techwr-
l.com/prescriptiveanalysis (citing KAREN A. SCHRIVER, DYNAMICS IN DOCUMENT
DESIGN (1997)) (discussing audience considerations in rhetoric); Bonni Graham,
Identity Crisis: The Persona as a Tool for Formulating and Evaluating Information
Design, Presentation at the 48th Society for Technical Communication Conference
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on what the audience brings to the transaction. Individual consum-
ers receive information in different contexts-with prior knowledge
or total ignorance, with predetermined opinions or open minds, with
indifference or passion-but labeling regulations are one size fits all.
This section examines the intersection of consumer preferences and
consumer knowledge with respect to process labeling. Not all con-
sumers can be misled, and consideration of consumer characteristics
may lead to a better labeling policy.
For example, in the case of carbon monoxide in meat packaging,
a label that says "packed with carbon monoxide" may not have any
effect on the behavior of informed consumers who already base their
purchase decisions on the freshness date, but it may encourage
greater diligence in uninformed consumers. The information on the
label would have an educational function for these consumers be-
cause it would bring forth an issue of concern that was not previ-
ously on their radars. On the other hand, the UDA organic seal on a
package of Oreos may have no effect on consumers who know that
"organic" refers to the agricultural methods employed in growing the
grains and sugar that went into the cookies. But some consumers
might be lead to believe that organic Oreos are somehow more nutri-
tious than conventional Oreos. The organic symbol would be mis-
leading for these consumers-cookies are bite-sized bundles of re-
fined carbohydrates, whether the sugar and white flour were grown
with chemicals or not.
Labeling policies should minimize the extent to which consum-
ers are misled to their detriment while enabling consumer sover-
eignty. Carbon monoxide packaging notwithstanding, process in-
formation in particular seems to collide with the not-misleading rule
because individual consumers bring such varied perspectives. Or do
they? Do most consumers know or care about growth hormones,
genetically engineered crops, how fish are grown, whether a Rabbi
supervised a kitchen, or whether a sheep grazed a meadow in central
Oregon or on the other side of the world? Perhaps a consideration of
consumer characteristics is in order."'
(May 13-16, 2001)) ("Editing and writing both require an understanding of our
audience .... ").
111. See McCabe, supra note 103, at 478 (calling for consumer studies).
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A. Consumer Preference and Consumer Knowledge
1. Consumer Preference: Negative, Positive, Irrelevant
Labeling rules should maximize consumer utility by enabling
consumers to get what they want.12 Consumers can be misled to
their detriment or tricked into spending too much when they care
about the information on the label, and they rely on the label to pro-
vide the information. Consumers who are indifferent or are very
knowledgeable-and so don't need to rely on the label-cannot be
misled. This section will develop these consumer characteristics and
explore the application of the not-misleading rule in this context.
The prohibition against misleading consumers is based on the
presumption that choices based on lack of information or wrong in-
formation diminish utility. This presumption is not always correct.
Sometimes people make choices that increase their welfare based on
misunderstandings or based on false assumptions. If choices that
increase welfare are desirable, then they are the "right" choices.
Reasoning based on false information or misapprehension is to be
avoided, and thus represents a "wrong" reason. In other words,
sometimes people make the right choices for the wrong reasons.
Sometimes label information leads consumers to the "right" choic-
es," 3 but not always for the "right" reasons.
Presumably consumers know what they want. When consumers
are indifferent, however, labeling may not matter. Does the informa-
tion on a label really matter at all? And if so, in what way does it
matter? Information itself is neutral. A cloned cow is simply a
cloned cow. A brown cow is a brown cow. For some consumers,
the information is interesting but irrelevant, and for other consumers,
it may not even be interesting.
112. See Smith & McPherson, supra note 14, at 330 (providing a definition of
liberty for this purpose: "People should be free to do what they like-and to opt
out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so.... [P]eople should be 'free
to choose."' (quoting THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 5)).
113. Thinking of labels as leading consumers may be paternalistic, but it is a lib-
erty-enhancing paternalism along the lines of the "libertarian paternalism" de-
scribed in recent writings. See id.; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Liber-
tarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (2003).
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Kosher food provides a useful example. When delivering a pres-
entation on this issue, I show two slides of the same food label. On
one slide, the label bears a small symbol called a heksher indicating
that the product is kosher.114 On the next slide, the heksher has been
removed from the label. I ask the audience if they see anything on
the labels that would make one product more or less attractive than
the other. I go back and forth a few times. Those in the audience
who happen to be Jewish and keep kosher may notice that the first
slide is kosher and the second is not, and as a result, some may ex-
press a preference. But most people see no difference at all; the hek-
sher provided no information whatsoever. Moreover, many people
do not even see the heksher. And for many who know that this sym-
bol indentifies the product as kosher, the presence of the heksher
probably makes no difference. This information is completely neu-
tral for most consumers. It plays no role in their purchasing behav-
ior.' 1
5
When information is irrelevant to consumers, there seems to be
only a limited role for regulation. Some state statutes limit the use of
the word "kosher" to foods prepared in accordance with orthodox
Jewish dietary laws, 1 6 and similar statutes apply to the word halal
requiring that it only be used to designate foods made in accordance
with Islamic dietary standards.' 7  While these statutes may raise
114. A hekhsher is the trademark of a kosher certification organization. The most
widely known is the symbol of the Orthodox Union and appears as a U within a
Circle. See Judaism 101, Kashrut: Jewish Dietary Laws, http://www.jewfaq.org/
kashrut.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
115. Of course, if the label designation is false, the product is misbranded whether
or not anyone reads it or cares. In the case of kosher foods, lawsuits and chal-
lenges to labels are likely to be brought by competitors. Another article could
address when federal regulation of label claims is warranted.
116. Such statutes have faced court challenges. Most recently, Georgia's kosher
labeling statute has been challenged under the Anti-Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment because it requires orthodox supervision for kosher certification.
See First Amended Complaint at 9-10, Lewis v. Irvin, No. 2009cv1l73206 (Ga.
Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/relig-
ion/lewis v irvinscomplaint.pdf; see also Elijah L. Milne, Protecting Islam's
Garden from the Wilderness: Halal Fraud Statutes and the First Amendment, 2 J.
FOOD L. & POL'Y 61, 63 n. 11 (2006) (providing a list of state statutes).
117. Only a handful of states (California, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, and Texas) have adopted statutes that regulate the use of the term halal on
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First Amendment issues," 8 the issue here is the use of label informa-
tion to convey something about process. The general kashrut desig-
nation does not make any claims about ingredients or the chemical
composition of the food.' 19 Accordingly, a product such as kosher
orange juice would not necessarily be any different from the non-
kosher version of that product. 20
If, however, consumers care about a certain characteristic, then
using a label to identify the presence of the characteristic should fa-
cilitate the decision to purchase. Caffeine presents another example.
Some carbonated beverages contain caffeine, while others do not.' 2'
The presence of caffeine does not usually carry a strong emotional
load one way or another, but consumers have preferences in both
directions. People who feel a need for stimulants want products with
caffeine, while others prefer caffeine-free products. If soda cans
were not labeled, but some soda had caffeine while others did not,
then consumers who wanted caffeinated beverages would likely
choose another beverage such as coffee or tea. Consumers who can-
food labels. See Milne, supra note 116, at 63 n.9, 71-72 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 383c (West 2005); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 637/5 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.297f (2005); MINN. STAT. §§ 31.658, 31.661 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-
98 (2005); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.881 (Vernon 2005)).
118. First Amended Complaint, supra note 116, at 7-10.
119. Many independent certifiers have arisen for both kosher and halal foods and
state statutes do not explicitly prefer one certifier over the others. In other words,
there is no federal or state "kosher" mark. Governmental participation is limited
to declaring that if food is marketed as "kosher" then it must be marked in a cer-
tain way by a certain kind of person. See Milne, supra note 116, at 63 n.9, 71-72
(citing statutes). In addition, Minnesota law explicitly mentions the placement of
marks on meat. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 31.661 (West Supp. 2009).
120. Some kashrut symbols do add a small "d," meaning that the food is dairy, or
the word "Pareve" or "Parev," indicating that the food has no dairy or meat ingre-
dients. See Judaism 101, supra note 114. The focus here, however, is on the
process information.
121. For example, in a 12 ounce container of 7up, Sprite, or Barq's Diet Root
Beer there are 0 mg. of caffeine. However, the same amount of Mountain Dew
has 54 milligrams of caffeine, the same amount of Coke has 35 milligrams, and
the same amount of Barq's Root Beer has 23 milligrams. Mayo Clinic, Caffeine
Content for Coffee, Tea, Soda and More, http://www.mayoclinic.com/
health/caffeine/an01211 (last visited Oct. 30, 2009). But see Caffeine Content in
Soda Can Vary, Study Finds, MSNBC, Sept. 4, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20593038.
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not tolerate caffeine, on the other hand, would do well to avoid all
soda. Only the consumers who are indifferent to the presence of
caffeine would consume soda regardless of labeling. In the case of
caffeine labeling on carbonated beverages, the presence of informa-
tion on labels helps consumers to choose the products they want and
assists the carbonated beverages market. 22  Thus, the labeling of
caffeine is mandatory. 123
In the case of caffeine, as in the case of kashrut, the information
itself is neutral; it is the character of the consumer that makes the
information meaningful and determines its function. 124 But for Jew-
ish consumers who care about eating kosher food, the information
that a food is kosher is critical, and for some ritually observant Jews,
non-kosher food products are not even "food." Similarly, for con-
sumers with a peanut allergy, products that contain peanuts are like a
poison. And for those sensitive to caffeine, caffeinated beverages
are like a dangerous drug.
When consumers have no preference for one product feature
over another, label information cannot mislead them to their finan-
cial detriment. Such consumers will make purchase decisions based
on the product features that matter to them-price, the attractiveness
of a package, or placement near the checkout registers. Consumers
who do have a preference, however, might be expected to take label
information into account when choosing foods. Consumers who
have preferences other than price, such as a preference for caffeine
or no caffeine, could be misled.
2. Consumer Knowledge
Consumer preference, however, is only half the equation. Con-
sumer knowledge is the other half. Labels can only be misleading if
consumers have a preference and rely on label claims to inform their
122. Similar analysis could be made for sugar versus artificial sweetener, the
presence or absence of nuts or raisins, and other food characteristics.
123. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 101.4 (2009). Caffeine is considered a "generally
recognized as safe" substance as long as the product contains no more than .02
percent caffeine. Id. § 182.1180.
124. See Grure & Rao, supra note 21, at 52 (noting that in all countries with
labeling regulations, labeling is mandatory for genetically engineered products that
are not substantially equivalent to their conventional counterparts).
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buying behavior. Consumers who know about kosher food, and
know what certain symbols signify, cannot be misled by the pres-
ence or absence of truthful labeling. Similarly, consumers who
know absolutely nothing, but also do not care, will not be misled by
truthful process labeling.
Recall the low fat applesauce example. 125 Consumers who are
trying to follow a low fat diet may do so by looking for food prod-
ucts labeled "low fat," or they may choose to learn the fat content of
the foods they like in order to make choices in the absence of label
information. A label that reads "low fat applesauce" could mislead a
consumer who cares about fat content and relies on labels, but does
not actually know much about dietary fat. Such a consumer might
believe that other applesauce brands are not low fat.
A consumer who knows that applesauce is always low fat cannot
be misled. And a consumer who does not care about fat content
cannot be misled. It is only the consumer who has a preference,
wants "low fat," but is not knowledgeable about that preference who
can be misled. Similarly, a consumer who wants to avoid rBST and
knows that Tillamook brand cheese comes from cows not treated
with rBST may choose to buy Tillamook brand cheese even though
it is not labeled to this effect. A consumer who prefers organically
produced vegetables and who personally knows a farmer using or-
ganic production methods may happily buy produce from the farmer,
even in the absence of USDA certification and labeling. So in gen-
eral, a consumer who is very knowledgeable about a food product
feature cannot be misled by a label claim and, as noted above, a con-
sumer who has no preference one way or another also cannot be mis-
led.
Of course, consumers who have clear preferences may be moti-
vated to become knowledgeable because of their preferences. But
sometimes consumers would have a preference if they knew that
they had a choice. Most consumers twenty years ago had no prefer-
ence for organically produced food; most did not know there was
such a thing. 126 Most would have said, however, that they preferred
125. See supra Part Il.C.
126. U.K. Has Third-Largest Food Market, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 6,
2003, available at http://www.independent.co.uklnews/uk/this-britainluk-has-
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produce grown without pesticides, other things being equal. 27 Pre-
sumably consumers opposed to pesticides would prefer organically
grown produce if they knew that "organic" meant "no pesticides."
It is only the consumer who develops a preference in the pres-
ence of labeling, or who has a preference but no knowledge, who can
be misled by the label.
The FDA's misbranding statute is supposed to prevent economic
harm by protecting consumers from paying for products that they do
not really want. 28 The FDA should not construe the statute in such a
way that would cause consumers to make decisions on bad informa-
tion. When knowledgeable consumers do not have a preference,
there is no need for labeling, especially if the presence of informa-
tion on a label would affect the behavior of non-knowledgeable con-
sumers. Since labels often have an educational function, consumers
may develop a preference in the presence of labeling. A potential
for misapprehension arises. For example, knowledgeable consumers
may know that sugar can be derived from sugar cane or from
beets. 2 9 Until recently, however, this information probably did not
thirdlargest-organic-food-market-734751.html ("Twenty years ago, those who
espoused the cause of organic food were considered a strange, marginal species.").
127. According to a recent documentary, Americans who have grown up in the
past thirty years have probably never tasted grass-fed beef. KING CORN, supra
note 15. Most beef cattle are corn fed, at least at the end of its lifetime. Id. Con-
sumers who do not know anything about the cattle that becomes their hamburgers
may not have a preference for grass-fed beef, but they might have a preference if
they knew they had a choice. Interestingly, one court used this example of the
absurdity of allowing consumer interest to impose labeling requirements: "For
instance, with respect to cattle, consumers might reasonably evince an interest in
knowing which grains herds were fed .... " Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy,
92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). However, the court continued to say that "[a]bsent.
• . some indication that this information bears on a reasonable concern for human
health or safety... the manufacturers cannot be compelled to disclose it." Id.
128. See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2006). The stated mission of the FDA is to protect
public health and safety. Id. Economic safety is a part of public health and safety
and is illustrated by the context in which the FDCA arose. At the time of the
FDCA's creation there was a concern about people being duped into buying prod-
ucts based on misleading claims. See MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLrrIcs: How THE
FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH 233 (2002).
129. In fact, 56.1% of U.S. sugar comes from sugar beets and the remaining
43.9% comes from sugar cane. See USDA Economic Research Service Briefing
Room, Sugar and Sweeteners: Recommended Data, http://www.ers.usda.gov/
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influence their purchase decisions one way or another; 130 those who
are avoiding refined carbohydrates will eschew products containing
sugar derived from either source, and those willing to eat sugar will
accept sugar from either source.13 1 Uninformed consumers, how-
ever, may think that beet sugar or cane sugar is a new ingredient.
132
The process information, "comes from beets," might cause an unin-
formed consumer to develop a preference. If an uninformed con-
sumer thought that the label implied a difference in the sugar be-
cause of its source, then such a consumer might be induced to pay
more for one type or the other. In other words, truthful label infor-
mation could mislead some consumers to their economic detriment,
which would be contrary to the statutory goal of preventing eco-
nomic harm.
Neither consumers who do not care about a product feature nor
consumers who know a lot about a product feature will be harmed if
the feature is labeled. Consider the following chart:
Briefing/Sugar/data.htm (follow link to "Table 16") (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
Globally 78% of sugar comes from sugar cane. ILLOVO SUGAR LTD., ANNUAL
REPORT 2008, at 44 (2008), available at http://www.illovo.co.za/Librar-
ies/2008_AnnualReport/AnnualReport_2008_Part_6.sflb.ashx.
130. The USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service approved gly-
phosate-resistant (Roundup Ready) sugar beets for commercial production in
1998. See Novartis Seeds and Monsanto Co.; Availability of Determination of
Nonregulated Status for Sugar Beet Genetically Engineered for Glyphosate Herbi-
cide Tolerance, 64 Fed. Reg. 1,177, 1,177-78 (Jan. 8, 1999); AgrEvo USA Co.;
Availability of Determination of Nonregulated Status for Sugar Beet Genetically
Engineered for Glufosinate Herbicide Tolerance, 63 Fed. Reg. 25,194, 25,194-95
(May 7, 1998). However, sugar cane has not yet been genetically engineered.
Consequently, consumers who are determined to avoid GMOs will now have a
reason to make a distinction between sugar from beets and sugar from sugar cane.
131. Andrew Pollack, Round 2 for Biotech Beets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007, at
Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/business/27sugar.html
(quoting David Berg, president of American Crystal Sugar, the nation's largest
sugar beet processor, about consumer attitudes toward the new genetically engi-
neered sugar beet: "Basically, we have not run into resistance.").
132. While typical consumers may not be aware of sugar coming from both sugar
beets and sugar cane, they are becoming more aware of sweeteners derived from
corn, such as high fructose corn syrup. Kim Severson, Sugar Is Back on Food
Labels, This Time as a Selling Point, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009, at Al, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/21/dining/21 sugar.html.
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Consumer Preference
Don't Care Do Care
Informed
Not misled to Not misled to
Consumer own detriment own detriment
Knowledge: Not informed Not misled to
__________ _______ wn dtrient Can be misleadown detriment
The only consumers who can be misled are those who are unin-
formed or unaware of a product feature and who have a preference,
or would likely develop a preference in the presence of labeling.
Labeling policies aimed at preventing deception should consider the
likelihood that labeling will create a preference as well as the possi-
bility that consumer ignorance will lead to detrimental purchasing
decisions.
B. Role of Consumer Concern in Labeling Regulation
1. Current Practices
The FDCA mandates labeling when the labeled feature involves
facts material to possible consequences of use of the product because
of "material" chemical differences in the food-in other words, la-
beling is mandatory when the label information is needed to identify
the food.'3 3 Labeling is usually voluntary when there is no material
difference.
In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala,3 4 a federal district court
noted that it was not clear whether "materiality" in the statute refers
only to safety or also to consumer interest.'35 The FDA took the po-
sition that the genetic engineering of foods did not result in any ma-
terial change. 3 6 The plaintiffs argued that the FDA should have
considered consumer interest, in addition to the special concerns of
133. 21 U.S.C. § 321(n).
134. 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000).
135. Id. at 178.
136. Id.
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religious groups and those with allergies. 37 The court noted that the
statute was silent on whether "material" includes consumer interest
as well as safety.'38 Consequently, the agency's interpretation was
entitled to deference if it was reasonable. 139 Ultimately, the court
found that the FDA's interpretation of "material" was a reasonable
interpretation and deferred to the agency's judgment.' 4 The court
questioned whether the agency would even be authorized to require
labeling merely because of consumer interest. 141
For producers, of course, labels are marketing tools. ff a food
product can bear a positive process label, the producer may enjoy a
higher profit margin. Producers would rather not provide negative
information. Julie Caswell suggests that a rule against labeling indi-
cates a fear of "consumer sovereignty."'' 42 However, if the "nega-
tive" information is about the use of new technology, providing the
information could possibly impede adoption of the technology. "
43
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. 178 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837, 864 (1984)).
140. Alliance for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 179.
141. Id. ("In the absence of evidence of a material difference between [milk from
cows treated with a synthetic hormone] and ordinary milk, the use of consumer
demand as the rationale for labeling would violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act." (alteration in original) (quoting Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1193
(W.D. Wis. 1995)).
142. Caswell, supra note 43, at 23 (arguing that allowing no label "has the draw-
back of suggesting that regulators and producers who use the technology are afraid
of consumer sovereignty and want to suppress other producers' ability to differen-
tiate products based on nonuse of the technology").
143. Id. Whether slowing the adoption of technology is a bad thing, of course,
may be subject to debate. See CARuso, supra note 7, at 32-33 (presenting an
intriguing treatment of risk analysis in adoption of new technology). The interpre-
tation of neutral information as warning or boast could be a result of media cover-
age of subject. According to a study of news coverage of GMOs, articles about
GMOs in 2001 and 2002 generally did not emphasize a positive or negative aspect
of agricultural biotechnology, although when they did address risks and benefits,
they covered both. Joan Thomson & Laura Dininni, What the Print Media Tell Us
About Agricultural Biotechnology: Will We Remember?, 20 CHOICEs 247, 250
(2005), available at http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2005-4/GMOs/2005-4-
07.htm. But at peak GMO coverage in 2001, risks were emphasized more often
than benefits. Id.
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But who decides which information is positive and which is nega-
tive? The positive or negative value of label information makes
sense in the case of religious dietary rules or allergens, but where do
other kinds of information get their value? Is "contains caffeine" a
positive statement or a warning? Why is "genetically engineered"
deemed to be negative? Why is "organic" positive? Why is
"cloned" negative?'"
There are costs associated with labeling policies. Aside from
any possible effect on market share, the cost of providing label in-
formation is not merely the cost of extra ink. To provide informa-
tion on a label one must have that information; accordingly, a label-
ing requirement necessarily forces producers to segregate products
that differ with respect to the labeled characteristic.' 45 For example,
a company that makes conventional and "organic" corn flakes must
keep them separate in order to use the "organic" label. 4 6 So one
144. Professor Margaret McCabe, a law professor at Franklin Pierce Law Center,
asked students to make arguments both ways. Students in favor of GMOs said
they wanted GMOs to be labeled because they wanted to support the intended
consequences of some genetically engineered plant properties such as fewer pesti-
cides and no-till farming. Other students wanted GMOs to be labeled because
they wanted to avoid the perception that GMOs are not "natural."
145. See JAMES A. RIDDLE, A PLAN FOR CO-EXISTENCE: BEST MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES FOR PRODUCERS OF GMO AND NON-GMO CROPS (2004),
http://www.wkkf.org/pubs/foodRur/BiotechBMPs03.final_00253_03862.pdf (ex-
plaining the extensive lengths that producers must go to keep non-GMO and GMO
products segregated); see also DANNENBERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 6 (highlight-
ing the increased costs of segregation, labeling, and testing under a mandatory
labeling scheme as opposed to a voluntary labeling scheme); A. Bryan Endres,
Coexistence Strategies, the Common Law of Biotechnology and Economic Liabil-
ity Risks, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 115, 127 (2008) ("[S]egregation is not merely an
issue of on-farm measures (e.g., seed testing, buffer zones, equipment cleaning,
and transportation segregation) [but it also] ... extends beyond initial processing
and requires segregation measures at each stage [of production].").
146. 7 C.F.R. § 205.272(a) (2009) ("The handler of an organic handling operation
must implement measures necessary to prevent the commingling of organic and
nonorganic products and protect organic products from contact with prohibited
substances."). But see National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548, 80,556
(Dec. 21, 2000) ("[7 C.F.R. § 205.105] prohibits the use of excluded methods in
organic operations. [But t]he presence of a detectable residue of a product of ex-
cluded methods alone does not necessarily constitute a violation of this regulation.
As long as an organic operation has not used excluded methods and takes reason-
2009
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question is whether the additional cost is worth it. For consumers
who are indifferent, the additional cost of process labeling would
result in disutility. If, for example, beet sugar and cane sugar had to
be labeled, consumers might develop a preference for one over the
other resulting in one sugar source carrying a premium price. But
the cost of segregation would be passed to all consumers, even those
who do not have a preference and were happy already. Indifferent
consumers would be paying more but would not be getting anything
for the extra cost.
There is only an extra cost if producers actually do segregate the
products. If a consumer preference only goes in one direction then
segregation is not needed for the conventional product. In the case
of foods made with genetically modified (GM) ingredients, for ex-
ample, consumers are generally indifferent or they prefer non-GM
products. Few, if any, would wish to avoid non-GM products. Most
process feature preferences are mono-directional: consumers prefer
organic products or are indifferent; they prefer non-irradiated prod-
ucts or are indifferent; they prefer non-rBST products or are indiffer-
ent. Are there consumers who actually seek out non-organic pro-
duce? In contrast, there are some preferences that go both ways:
consumers prefer either caffeine or no caffeine; they prefer non-fat
milk or whole milk. If the preference only goes one way, then not
all producers need to segregate their products. Thus in the case of
GM foods, consumers who are willing to buy GM products are gen-
erally also willing to consume non-GM products. Only producers of
non-GM foods need to segregate their products, and thus only the
non-GM products carry the extra costs.
Another role for label information is to provide consumers with
the feeling that they are making choices. Exercising the right to
choose can be a benefit or a burden. 147 While all consumers say,
"Surprise me," from time to time, they also like to think they are in
able steps to avoid contact with the products of excluded methods as detailed in
their approved organic system plan, the unintentional presence of the products of
excluded methods should not affect the status of an organic product or opera-
tion.").
147. Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1, 12 (1996).
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control of their lives. 48 Debra Strauss cites studies that show that
over 90 percent of Americans think genetically engineered foods
should be labeled, but a significantly smaller percentage would actu-
ally look for that information on the label. 149 In other words, con-
sumers want information not only when it matters for decision mak-
ing, but just for information's sake. Information helps consumers
think they are making better decisions, even when they are ignoring
the information in front of them.
If labeling were mandatory, and if the default products contain
GM ingredients, a U.S. producer would generally label all products
as containing GM soy even though some products also contain non-
GM soy. 50 The extra cost would only be borne by the special non-
GMO products, which would then be the unlabeled products. Gru~re
and Rao argue that if all of the products are labeled as containing
GMOs, whether or not they do, consumers still have no choice.
151
Consumers may not have a choice, but they would have access to
information that is currently absent.
Federal statutes and FDA labeling regulations do not account for
this kind of label value. Indeed, the statutory requirement that label-
ing must not be misleading may sometimes run counter to this no-
tion. When truthful label information is prohibited because it might
be "misleading," some consumers will feel deprived of their deci-
sion-making power.
148. John A. Edwards & Gifford Weary, Antecedents of Causal Uncertainty and
Perceived Control: A Prospective Study, 12 EUR. J. PERSONALITY 135, 135 (1998)
(finding that feelings of lack of control and causal uncertainty related to increased
levels of "depressive symptomatology").
149. Strauss, supra note 66, at 190 & nn.187-88.
150. Grure & Rao, supra note 21, at 56 (citing Xiangyang Chang, Labeling Pol-
icy in China, in INT'L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST. & RESEARCH & INFO. SYS.
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ECONOMIC CONSIDERATION OF BIOSAFETY AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATIONS IN INDIA 16 (2007) (stating that mandatory label-
ing results in almost all soybean oil labeled as GM)).
151. Id.
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V. CONCLUSIONS-CAN'T MISLEAD ALL CONSUMERS
GMOs make a particularly interesting case study because the la-
beling requirements differ between Europe and the U.S. A recent
study of consumer welfare found that introducing and labeling GM
food, on the whole, has been "welfare enhancing" for U.S. consum-
ers. 2 This means that the benefit of lower cost outweighs any pref-
erence for non-GM food.153 The same study came to the opposite
conclusion for European consumers.'5 4 What explains the differ-
ence?
In the European Union, the presence of GMOs in foods must be
labeled. 55 In the U.S., however, if the food is "substantially equiva-
lent"-a term with no clear meaning -then no labeling is re-
quired.'57 Accordingly, there is no mandatory labeling of GMOs,
although the absence of GMOs may be shown voluntarily. Econo-
mists have studied the characteristics of consumers in both markets,
and have theorized about the cultural influences that account for
those differences. For example, one study showed that Americans
perform better than Europeans on quizzes about the genetic con-
152. Jayson L. Lusk et al., Consumer Welfare Effects of Introducing and Labeling
Genetically Modified Food, 88 ECON. LETTERs 382, 384 (2005).
153. See Kym Anderson & Lee Ann Jackson, Why Are US and EU Policies To-
ward GMOs So Different?, 6 AGBIOFORUM 95, 98 (2003), available at
http://www.agbioforum.org/v6n3/v6n3a02-jackson.pdf (finding that U.S. farmers
have much more to lose in terms of real income from anti-GMO policies, whereas
EU farmers benefit in terms of real income from a protectionist anti-GMO policy).
154. Lusk et al., supra note 152, at 384.
155. Council Regulation 1829/2003, art. 13, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1, 11-12; see
Rachele Berglund Bailey, Comment, A Tale of Two Systems: A Comparison Be-
tween U.S. and EU Labeling Policies of Genetically Modified Foods, 15 SAN
JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 193, 202-10 (2006) (comparing U.S. and E.U. regula-
tions).
156. Strauss, supra note 66, at 174. Strauss also claims that European opposition
to GMOs was a reaction to lack of choice, rather than an aversion to the goods
themselves. Id. at 181.
157. Id. at 183-84 (citing Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant
Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,991 (May 29, 1992)).
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cepts, 5 8 but that they are less aware of the existence of GMOs in the
food supply. 5 9
Response to GM foods has been far more negative in Europe and
parts of Asia. 16' Europeans in general are more opposed to GM
foods than are Americans. As a result, GM foods were initially
banned in Europe and are only slowly gaining a toehold. Since the
presence of GM ingredients must be labeled, however, most foods
do not include GM ingredients. Moreover, the labeling requirement
creates trade challenges for U.S. producers.
While it is not completely clear why attitudes towards GM foods
are so different in the U.S. and Europe, 61 two theories stand out with
respect to the discussion of consumer knowledge and preferences.
One is that Americans have a tendency to place a lot of trust in both
government agencies and scientists. 62 So when the FDA publicizes
its "science-based" findings, many Americans find the agency's
statements highly reliable. The information available may be just
enough to keep Americans from asking for more specific informa-
tion and, consequently, to prevent them from developing a prefer-
ence. Perhaps American consumers would develop preferences if
they were given more information, but as it stands, American con-
sumers do not have enough information to even contemplate looking
for more.
It may be possible that American consumers are simply not ex-
posed to enough information. One study found that the European
press had covered GM issues more extensively than the American
158. See W. Carl Hebden et al., Consumer Responses to GM Foods: Why Are
Americans So Different?, 20 CHOICEs 243, 243 (2005), available at
http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2005-4/GMOs/2005-4-06.htm.
159. Id. "[L]ess than half of Americans realize that foods containing GM ingredi-
ents are sold in supermarkets and less than one in three believe that they have per-
sonally consumed GM foods. Those who know GM foods are sold in supermar-
kets are also confused as to which products are on the shelf." Id.; see also William
K. Hallman & W. Carl Hebden, American Opinions of GM Food: Awareness,
Knowledge, and Implications for Education, 20 CHOICEs 239, 239 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2005-4/GMOs/2005-4-05.htm.
160. Hebden et al., supra note 158, at 243.
161. Id. at 244-45.
162. Id.
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media. 63 Another study showed that a lot of media coverage about
GM foods does not go into risks and benefits.' 64 Accordingly, it is
not surprising that most American consumers are poorly informed on
this topic and that they have no preference regarding GMOs.
William Hallman and Helen Aquino suggest that labeling poli-
cies in Europe and the U.S., at least theoretically, do accommodate
consumer preferences by minimizing costs while allowing the major-
ity of consumers to make the choices they prefer.165 In Europe,
where the majority of consumers presumably do not want GMOs,
unmarked packages cannot contain GMOs. Any additional cost of
labeling is borne by foods that do contain GMOs.
In the U.S., the majority of consumers presumably do not care
about the presence of GMOs in food products, and unlabeled prod-
ucts may contain GMOs. Any additional labeling cost is borne by
those who wish to avoid GMOs. Implicit in this policy choice is the
notion that consumers should not care about GMOs, which the FDA,
using its science-based approach, has determined to be safe. Al-
though the voluntary labeling approach does allow consumers with
clear preferences to avoid products containing GMOs, it is only at
additional expense.
Overall, European consumers, who receive their information
from nonprofit organizations, are opposed to GMOs; 166 the negative
information must appear on the label. The European requirement
that negative information should appear on labels has affected the
choices available to Europeans. Most European producers do not
use GMOs, and therefore they do not have to provide label informa-
tion. 167 The default label in Europe indicates that there are no GMOs
in the product, and consumers know this fact, or believe it. This ar-
163. Thomson & Dininni, supra note 143, at 247.
164. Id. at 250.
165. William K. Hallman & Helen L. Aquino, Consumers' Desire for GM Labels:
Is the Devil in the Details?, 20 CHOICES 217, 218 (2005), available at
http://www.foodpolicyinstitute.org/docs/pubs/consumers-desire-forGM-lables.p
df.
166. An Overview of European Consumer Polls on Attitudes Toward GMOs,
GMO COMPASS, Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.gmo-compass.org/eng/news/stories/
415.anoverview-european-consumer-polls-attitudes-gmos.html.
167. See Jeremy Smith, European Shelves Mostly GMO-Free, REUTERS, Feb. 3,
2005, available at http://www.organicconsumers.org/ge/gmofree20705.cfm.
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guably shows that mandatory labeling does not increase consumer
choice, but instead tips the market towards the majority consumer
preference. 6 8 In the U.S., GMOs are not labeled, so the default la-
bel-the unmarked package-means the product might contain
GMOs, but consumers are unaware of this possibility. Most proc-
essed foods do contain GMOs, so Americans are not presented with
much choice either. And while most American consumers do not
have strong preferences, as it turns out, it is because they have never
thought about the issue. Most soy in the U.S. is Roundup Ready
soy-genetically engineered to be glyphosate tolerant. 69 However,
most consumers probably do not know this fact. 70
Interestingly enough, American consumers may change their
minds when they are provided with adequate information. Although
U.S. consumers generally have few preferences, this is not true of all
U.S. consumers. One study found that consumers who are relatively
well informed about genetic engineering do not want GMOs and are
willing to pay a premium to avoid them. 7 ' Well-informed consum-
168. See Wallace E. Huffman et al., The Effects of Prior Beliefs and Learning on
Consumers' Acceptance of Genetically Modified Foods, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 193, 199-201 (2007); Jayson L. Lusk et al., Alternative Calibration and
Auction Institutions for Predicting Consumer Willingness to Pay for Nongeneti-
cally Modified Corn Chips, 26 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 40, 53 (2001).
169. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, GENETICALLY MODIFIED
CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (2004), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploaded-
Files/wwwpewtrustsorg/FactSheets/Food andBiotechnology/PJFBGenetically
_ModifiedCrops-Factsheet08O4.pdf. According to the Pew Initiative, in 2004,
85 % of the soy grown in the United States was genetically engineered, as was
45% of the corn, and 76% of the cotton. Id. Moreover, because genetically engi-
neered corn and soybeans are often commingled with conventional crops, the per-
centage of processed soy or corn products containing some genetically engineered
component, is probably even higher, and those processed foods that contain soy or
corn products, generally contain some genetically engineered crops.
170. See Hebden et al., supra note 158, at 243 ("It is ... unlikely that many
Americans are aware that there is a worldwide controversy surrounding the foods
they eat every day[,]" and "less than one in three believe that they have personally
consumed GM foods.").
171. DANNENBERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 16 (finding that consumers were will-
ing to pay 47-59 percent more for the same product that was not genetically engi-
neered); see also Edna Einsiedel, Consumers and GM Food Labels: Providing
Information or Sowing Confusion?, 3 AGBIOFORUM 231, 232 (2000) ("[A] sum-
mary of consumer attitudes to GM food labeling showed that anywhere from 57%
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ers look for GMO information on labels and consider it to be process
information, albeit for a process they wish to avoid.'72 Less knowl-
edgeable consumers, however, do not look for information about
GMOs'73 and are more likely to regard GMO labeling as a warning
with implications about the quality or safety of the product. 7 4 It is
precisely this interpretation of the label that makes the label mislead-
ing, potentially making the food misbranded.'75
Ironically, both groups of consumers end up behaving the same
way, but for different reasons. Consumers who are most aware of
genetic engineering tend to disapprove of the process and would re-
gard a GMO label as negative information and would avoid the
product. 17 6 Consumers who do not know about genetic engineering
would regard a GMO label as a warning and would also avoid the
product. Both groups would avoid the product; 77 the label would
lead the uninformed and easily misled consumer to behave like a
knowledgeable consumer.
Interestingly, in studies, consumers who would perceive "con-
tains GM" as a warning also said that they would be more likely to
of consumers in the US to 82% of German consumers said they would be 'less
likely to buy GM-labeled products."' (citing Peter W.B. Phillips & Heather Foster,
Labeling for GM Foods: Theory and Practice (NSERC/SSHRC Chair Program,
Working Paper 3, 2000)).
172. See DANNENBERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 14.
173. A recent FDA call for comments claims that in 2002, 19 percent of all con-
sumers surveyed said they "never" look at the food label when buying a product
for the first time. Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection;
Comment Request; Internet Survey on Barriers to Food Label Use, 74 Fed. Reg.
42,676, 42,677 (Aug. 24, 2009); see also Hallman & Aquino, supra note 165, at
219 (finding that when asked what additional label information they wanted, 78
percent of consumers said none).
174. Caswell, supra note 43, at 23 (finding that problems may arise when process
labels are interpreted as indicators of product safety in cases where regulators
believe it is not an indicator of safety); see also Hallman & Aquino, supra note
165, at 220 (finding that less aware consumers say they would want more informa-
tion about biotechnology before buying GM-labeled products).
175. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(n), 343(a) (2006). Labeling that misleads the consumer
into thinking that that there is a material difference in the product where no mate-
rial difference exists, is a misleading label. What responsibility does the labeler
have to educate the consumer so that the label does not mislead?
176. Hallman & Aquino, supra note 165, at 220.
177. Id.
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buy GM products if they had adequate assurances of safety from
trusted sources such as the FDA.' In a sense, these consumers may
now be making the "right" choice for them, but for the "wrong" rea-
son. They choose GM foods because it never occurred to them that
the foods are GM foods. If the consumers knew that the foods were
GM and had enough information about the process, they might still
choose to buy the GM products, fully aware of what they were buy-
ing. In doing this, they would be exercising consumer sovereignty
by choosing to consume GM foods. But what if these same consum-
ers, given the information they say they would want, would choose
to avoid GM products? What if most consumers would choose to
avoid GM products if they knew more about genetic engineering? If
that is the case, then most consumers are currently being misled by
the absence of labeling on most products.
Is there not an argument to be made that consumers only truly
have preferences when they have information? What is a preference
if not a choice? If the presence of label information causes consum-
ers to behave as if they were knowledgeable, then the label has the
effect of improving economic efficiency. When consumers prefer a
product out of ignorance when they would disapprove it with knowl-
edge, producers enjoy a marketing position that is assumption-based,
not science-based.
1 79
In my opinion, this evidence merits further study: American con-
sumers who are the most aware of GMOs prefer to avoid them.
American consumers who know nothing about GMOs do not care
and are motivated by price. When presented with information on a
label, assuming they notice it, and they do not always notice it,18 0 the
unknowing consumers tend to perceive the label information as a
178. Id.
179. Angela Tregear, Proximity and Typicity: A Typology of Local Food Identities
in the Marketplace, ANTHROPOLOGY FOOD, Mar. 2007, http://aof.revues.org/in-
dex438.html. "[B]ecause of the economic values inherent in high reputation dis-
tant specialty food brands, other manufacturing firms outside the distant specialty
production area are often tempted to 'steal' a portion of the economic rent through
copying, counterfeiting and usurpation of the name or brand." Id.
180. Hallman & Aquino, supra note 165, at 219 (finding that less aware consum-
ers say they would want more information about biotechnology before buying
GM-labeled products).
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warning. The label does two things-it tells them there is an issue
of concern, serving an educational function, and it warns them about
this product. The unknowing and misled consumer behaves just like
a knowledgeable consumer because of the warning function the label
serves. In other words, when the label functions as a warning and
there is no real issue of safety, consumers may make the "right"
choice, the choice that reflects a knowledgeable consumer's prefer-
ences and would reflect this consumer's preferences if enabled to
develop a preference. The choice would be the utility maximizing
choice, but it would be made for the "wrong" reason-a fear of a
non-existent safety issue.
Mandatory labeling for negative information would help guide
consumers to products they really prefer in instances where they
would care if they had adequate information. Voluntary labeling
presumably provides information for consumers who really care
about the issue. With respect to those consumers, voluntary labeling
is de facto mandatory labeling because the absence of a label be-
comes meaningful. But voluntary labeling does not provide enough
educational value for consumers who know nothing. Voluntary la-
beling may mean that the educational function of a label is lost due
to fear that information will be misinterpreted as a warning. Con-
sumers lose as a result of a lack of knowledge, and therefore a lack
of choice.
The USDA Organic label, for example, means something about
process, but means nothing about the end product. Is it misleading?
Does anyone really think that organic Oreos are a healthy choice or
that they are different from conventional Oreos? Probably. There
are likely consumers who buy organic junk food because they think
it is better for them. They are doing the right thing for the wrong
reason. Why is buying organic the "right" thing? Most consumers
presented with facts about organic production-that it is created
without pesticides, that it is more sustainable and more environmen-
tally friendly-would choose organically produced foods when other
things, such as cost, are equal. If consumers buy a product they
would prefer if they had all of the information, they are making the
"fight" choice; the choice that lines up with their preferences. But if
they buy the organic cookies for some other reason, such as an erro-
neous belief that "organic" means nutritious, they are acting for the
Vol. 8, No. I
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wrong reason. When acting for the wrong reason gives the con-
sumer the "right" product, the consumer suffers no economic detri-
ment.
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